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introduction
Imagine. Micromedex, Inc., a provider of in-depth medical information,
invests hundreds of thousands of dollars developing a comprehensive and
reliable database of poison antidotes called Poisindex. 1 Micromedex
expects to recoup its costs and make a profit by licensing the database to
1. This fictional example is adapted from Anne E. Kornblut, Database Compilers
Fightfor Copyright Protection,BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1999, at Al.
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hospitals and health clinics in the United States and abroad. The database
provides an invaluable tool for the public, and Micromedex sells its first
batch of copies in the United States. But then sales stop. Micromedex discovers that the database was copied onto the Internet and eventually copied in the United States and Europe. Consulting its attorneys, Micromedex
discovers that the copying was perfectly legal in each instance, and there
was virtually nothing it could have done to protect its database from
piracy.2 Unable to sell another copy, Micromedex writes off the loss and
halts all investment in databases. Moreover, observing Micromedex's hard
lesson, every other private investor avoids databases. As a result, U.S. businesses fail to create countless databases that could benefit the public. This
example illustrates the database dilemma in the United States.
Over the past decade, Congress has contemplated several bills for protecting non-creative databases 3 such as Micromedex's Poisindex. The issue

is which proposal the United States should adopt. This Note offers a proposal for legislation to resolve the database dilemma in both the United
States and abroad. Part I describes the history of database protection in
the United States and recent legislative proposals for resolving the
4
dilemma, including strong bills based on creating a sui generis right in
certain forms of data and weak bills based on misappropriation law. Part
II discusses the current international framework for database protection
with an emphasis on a regional agreement adopted by the European Union
in 1996, which created a sui generis right for protecting non-creative
databases. Part III argues that because the two current legislative proposals before Congress are flawed-one being too weak and the other too
strong-a compromise proposal is required. The compromise attempts to
5
strike a balance between creating an incentive for database makers to
invest in databases, obtaining international protection for U.S. database
makers, and preventing debilitating monopolies over data in the United
States.
Database Protection in the United States
In the United States, copyright law provides scant protection for
databases. 6 In what follows, the present state of database protection in the
I.

2. This is not entirely true. Although Micromedex could not protect its database
under federal copyright law, it may have been able to protect itself from piracy through
licensing agreements and other self-created protections. See infra Part III.
3. For a description of non-creative databases, see infra Part I.
4. The European Union Database Directive uses this term to describe the right created for the protection of non-creative databases. This term is appropriate because such
a right creates a new regime of legal protection that finds no origin in copyright laws,
misappropriation laws, or any other area of U.S. law.
5. The term "database maker" includes the creator of the database and the entity
owning the database.
6. Discussion of U.S. copyright law covers federal copyright, not state copyright.
State copyright "claims are either preempted by the Copyright Act or provide protection
that is useless for mass-produced, readily-accessible databases." Jeffrey C. Wolken,
Note, Just The Facts, Ma'am. A Case For Uniform Federal Regulation of Information
Databases in The New Information Age, 48 SYRACUSE L. RaV. 1263, 1291 (1998).
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United States is presented in two subsections. The first describes present
protection of creative databases under the Copyright Act. 7 The second
describes recent legislative attempts to extend protection to non-creative
databases.
A.

Present Copyright Protection of Databases in the United States

1. Pre-1991 Protection of Databases:The Sweat of the Brow Doctrine
Although creative databases are potentially copyrightable as "compilations" under the Copyright Act,8 an axiom of copyright law is that only
expressions are protectable, not facts or ideas. 9 A database of facts stands
on dubious ground. Historically, courts extended copyright law to cover
some factual compilations under the judicially created "sweat of the brow"
doctrine. 10 Under this doctrine, protection could be afforded to a factual
compilation if the author showed sufficient effort and expense in generating the final product.1 1 Database protection under this regime bore the
following rough characteristics:
U.S. Copyright Protection of Databases: Pre-1991
Source
Scope
Rights
Exceptions
Duration

The Federal Copyright Act combined with the common law "sweat of the brow"
doctrine protected non-creative databases.
Copyright protection applied to (1) factual compilations that were (2) created at
sufficient labor and expense to the compiler.
The owner of a copyright
in a non-creative database had the exclusive right to
12
reproduce the work.
The rights of copyright ownership were limited by the "fair use" defense 13 and
other important exceptions.
Copyright
ownership continued for the life of the author, or compiler, plus fifty
1
years.

7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1999).
8. See id. § 101. A compilation is "a work formed by the collection and assembling
of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." Id.
9. Although the Copyright Act expressly excludes ideas as copyrightable subject
matter, it does not expressly exclude the protection of facts. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
However, § 102(b) does exclude "discoveries" from protection, and the Supreme Court
has held that facts are not a copyrightable subject matter. Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985). In Harper,the Court held that facts
cannot be protected because they lack originality: "[Clopyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's work those constituent elements that are
not original-for example ...facts, or materials in the public domain-as long as such
use does not unfairly appropriate the author's original contributions." Id.
10. See generally MARSHALL LEAIFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw 69-71 (3d ed.
1999) (explaining "sweat of the brow").
11. Id. at 69.
12. For an enumeration of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 106.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement that allows a
third party to use a copyrighted work in a reasonable manner without the copyright
owner's consent. LnF.1FER, supra note 10, at 427- 69.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). Duration is now seventy years. Also, the duration is based
on certain assumptions-for example that the work was created after January 1, 1978.
See LEAFaR, supra note 10, at 223-36.
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For example, in Jeweler's CircularPublishingCo. v. Keystone Publishing
Co., the Second Circuit held that whether a book may be protected does not
depend on whether the materials that make up the book consist of matters
that "show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or
anything more than industrious collection."1 5 Thus, sufficient labor could
inject a factual compilation into the realm of copyright law. Under this
regime, Micromedex would have a chance to protect its Poisindex against
piracy in the United States.
2.

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: The
Originality Requirement

In 1991, the Supreme Court eliminated the "sweat of the brow" doctrine in
Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. by imposing an originality requirement on every copyrightable work. 16 In Feist, a local phone
company brought an unsuccessful suit against a publishing company for
copying the white pages of its phone book. 1 7 The Court held that an
alphabetical listing of people and their addresses was not sufficiently "original."'1 8 The Court emphasized that the primary objective for copyright
under the Constitution is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts," not to reward the labors of authors. 19 As a result, the Court found
that a database may receive copyright protection only if the selection, coordination, or arrangement of its facts are sufficiently original, where "originality" is understood to mean that the work was not copied and contained
a modicum of creativity. 20 As a result, Feist terminated all copyright protection for non-creative databases, regardless of the expense and labor
21
incurred by the creators of databases.
3.

Post-1991 Protection of Databases: Creative Databases

Although Feist leaves room for the protection of creative databases, this
protection is thin. Most post-Feist litigation in the area of copyright
infringement of databases involves the level and nature of creativity
required to trigger copyright protection. The courts have developed a few
methods for measuring the requisite creativity. 2 2 One such test is whether
15. 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922) (emphasis added).

16. 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
17. Before copying the pages, the publishing company first asked the telephone company to license their use of the directory, but the telephone company was refused. Id. at
343.
18. Id. at 361.
19. Id. at 349. The U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall have the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8.
20. This language is also now part of the definition of "compilation" in the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999).
21. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363-64; Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 607,

607-10 (1992).
22. Terry M. Sanks, DatabaseProtection:National and InternationalAttempts to Provide Legal Protectionfor Databases, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 991, 1001-03 (1998).
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the selection of the data constitutes "thoughtful" selection. For example,
the plaintiff in Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc. collected business cards, copied restaurant listings from
another directory, and ultimately produced a "yellow pages" for New York's
Chinese business community, which included about 9000 listings organized into 260 business categories. 23 The defendant allegedly copied 1500
the
of the plaintiffs listings. 24 The Second Circuit concluded that
25
"database" was sufficiently creative to receive copyright protection.
Another guide for measuring creativity in databases is to look at how
its creators selected and arranged the data as a whole. In the highly publicized case of Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., Warren Publishing sued Microdos for allegedly copying its factbook containing
information about all cable television systems in the United States and selling an electronic version of it. 26 The Eleventh Circuit held that Warren
Publishing could not protect its factbook under copyright law because the
book lacked sufficient creativity. 27 The court focused on how Microdos

selected and arranged the data as a whole and concluded that Microdos
copied no original selection, coordination, or arrangement of Warren's factual compilation. 28 According to the court, copying data is not considered
infringement if the selection and arrangement in the new work is not substantially similar to the selection and arrangement in the original.
A third method for determining whether a database contains adequate
creativity is the "merger doctrine" -where there is only one or a few ways of
expressing an idea, the expression merges with the idea and cannot be
copyrighted. 2 9 It follows from this doctrine that functional selections or
arrangements of data according to basic organizing principles such as
alphabetizing, cross-referencing, geographic areas, or chronological order
30
are not protected.
23. 945 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1991). See generallyJohn M. Conley et al., Database
Protection in a Digital World, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (Symposium 1999), at http://
www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6il/conley.html.
24. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 511.
25. Id. at 513. However, the court ultimately held for the defendant for unrelated
reasons. One commentator described the element of creativity:
[The database] cited her initial judgment to select only those New York businesses that would be of interest to the Chinese-American community, and her
testimony that she subsequently exercised discretion in excluding individual
businesses that she thought would not remain open for very long. These acts of
"thought and creativity" distinguished the Key directory from the typical whitepages, whose compiler "'slavishly"' includes every available listing.
Conley et al., supra note 23, c 48.
26. 115 F.3d 1509, 1510-14 (11th Cir. 1997).
27. Id. at 1520-21.
28. Id.
29. LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 82.
30. This doctrine precludes from protection compilations that classify churches by
denomination, attorneys by areas of specialty, cable systems by principal community
served, and radiators by manufacturer and application. Richard L. Stone & John D.
Pernick, Protecting Databases:Copyright? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Copyright, 16 COMPUThE LAw 17 (1999).
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Each method for measuring creativity in databases suggests that it is
difficult to meet the standard of creativity in the ordinary, useful database.
Indeed, the more comprehensive and useful the selection or arrangement
31
of the data, the less likely it will be protected by copyright.
The following table summarizes the present protection afforded to
databases in the United States under copyright law:
U.S. Copyright Protection of Databases: Present
Source
Scope
Rights
Exceptions
Duration

The Federal Copyright Act protects some creative databases.
Copyright protection applies to (1) factual compilations that are (2) selected,
coordinated, or arranged in a sufficiently creative way.
The owner of a copyright in a creative database has the exclusive right to
reproduce the3 work,
create derivative works based on the database, and other
2
related rights.
The rights of copyright ownership are limited by the "fair use" defense 3 3 and
other important exceptions.
34
Copyright ownership continues for the life of the author plus seventy years.

Assuming that Micromedex's database lacks the required creativity by
presenting the poison antidotes in alphabetical order and categorizing
them according to industry standard, then present copyright law would
provide no protection in the United States.
B.

Legislative Proposals for Protecting Non-creative Databases

Since 1996, Congress has considered several bills designed to deal with the
database dilemma. Although each proposal attempts to replace the originality requirement with some form of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine,
they differ significantly on the level of protection afforded to non-creative
databases. Some proposals would provide a high level of protection based
on a sui generis property right in non-creative databases, a regime modeled
on the European Union's Database Directive. 35 Others would provide a
low level of protection modeled on misappropriation doctrines and would
prevent pirates from extracting data from non-creative databases in certain
contexts. However, no proposal has survived the Senate.
1. Database Investment and Intellectual PropertyAntipiracy Act (House
Bill 3531)
The 104th Congress considered the Database Investment and Intellectual
Property Antipiracy Act, 3 6 which went outside copyright law and sought to
create a new and unique, or sui generis, right protecting certain
31. See id.
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1999) for a list of the exclusive rights of the owner of a

copyright.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 107. See

L.FE,, supra note

10.

34. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). This duration is based on certain assumptions-for example,
the work was created after January 1, 1978. See LEAa'l., supra note 10, at 223-36.

35. See supra Part II.B.
36. H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996). Former Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead of California
introduced this bill on May 23, 1996.
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databases.3 7 The basic contours of the proposal included the following:
The Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act: House Bill 3531
Source
Scope

Rights

Exceptions
Duration
Remedies

The proposed statute would have created a sui generis right outside copyright
law that protected non-creative databases.
Protection would have applied to (1) collections or compilations (in any
medium) arranged in a systematic or methodical way 3 8 (2) that are the result of
a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial investment of human, technical,
financial, or other resources in the collection, assembly, verification,
organization or presentation of the database contents
3 9 if (3) the database is used,
reused, or intended for use or reuse in commerce.
The statute would have prohibited (1) the extraction of all or a substantial part
of the contents of a database in a way that (2) conflicts with the database
owner's normal exploitation of the
4 0 database or adversely affects the actual or
potential market for the database.
The statute would have provided no exception for personal, educational,
scientific, or research uses.
The property right in the database would continue for a twenty-five-year
period,
4 1
but this could restart upon any significant change to the database.
The statute would have provided extensive civil-injunctive relief,
42
impoundment, and monetary relief-and criminal penalties for a violation.

This proposal was broad in scope because it did not require even a modicum of creativity, 4 3 required a relatively small amount of extraction to trigger infringement, 44 gave few exceptions, 45 and left the potential for
perpetual protection through ongoing changes to the database. For these
46
and other reasons, the proposal died in the Judiciary Committee.
2.

47
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (House Bill 2652)

The successor bill in the 105th Congress was the Collections of Informa37. This proposal was modeled on the EU Database Directive. See supra Part 1I.B.
38. Under the proposal, "'[d]atabase' means a collection, assembly or compilation,
in any form or medium now or later known or developed, of works, data or other
materials, arranged in a systematic or methodical way." H.R. 3531, § 2.
39. Id. § 3(a).
40. Id. § 4.
41. Id. § 6. The term of protection would have been twenty-five years from January 1
after the date that the database is placed into commercial use or made available to the
public, whichever is earlier
42. Id. §§ 7-8.
43. Presumably, the proposal would cover phone books, history or math books, literary works, and musical works. Sanks, supra note 22, at 1003.
44. Under the proposal, "'[e]xtraction' means the permanent or temporary transfer
of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database or of a copy or copies thereof."
H.R. 3531, § 2.

45. The bill did "not provide an exception for personal or scientific uses." Sanks,
supra note 22, at 1005. As one commentator points out,
suppose a researcher is close to developing a cure for AIDS and wanted to pay a
fee to use segments of a database which may hold the final keys to a solution. If
the owner of this database refuses, the researcher must attempt to recreate the
original database from scratch, assuming, of course, that the original information is still available.
Id.
46. Id. at 994, 1003-06.
47. Also during the same Congressional session,
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tion Antipiracy Act.4 8 Like its predecessor, this bill also would have created a sui generis right; however, it attempted to protect non-creative
databases by adding a chapter titled "Misappropriation of Collections of
Information" to the Copyright Act. 49 This proposal comprised the following features.
The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: House Bill 2652
The proposal would have created a sui generis right protecting non-creative
databases by expanding the Copyright Act with a chapter entitled
"Misappropriation of Collections of Information."
Protection would have applied to (1) collections of "facts, data, works of
Scope
material capable of being collected and
authorship, or any other intangible
organized in a systematic way" 50 that were (2) gathered, organized, or
maintained through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources
and that were (3) offered or intended to be offered for sale or otherwise in
commerce.
The statute would have prohibited (1) the extraction of all or a substantial part
Rights
of the contents of the5 1database that (2) caused harm to the actual or potential
market of the owner.
Exceptions The bill enumerated a number of exceptions including (1) extraction or use of
insubstantial parts of a protected collection (e.g., individual items of
information), (2) use of protected information to verify independently gathered
data, (3) non-profit research in a manner that does not hurt the actual or
potential market for the database, (4) reporting the news, and (5) gathering
information by other means. 52 Moreover, the bill excluded government
collections from protection.
53
The bill specified no duration for protection.
Duration
and
The bill prescribed civil remedies-injunctive relief; impoundment;
Remedies
4
monetary relief, including damages and attorneys' fees,5 -and criminal
penalties, including fines rangi.g from $250,000 to $500,000 and
imprisonment for five to ten years.-Source

Although House Bill 2652 passed in the House of Representatives
twice and accommodated the criticisms aimed at its predecessor, the Sen[t]he Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), an Arlington,
Virginia-based trade association, argued unsuccessfully for legislation based on
state misappropriation laws. The ITAA proposal would have created a cause of
action in favor of a database producer against a person who made unauthorized
use of information generated by a substantial investment of time or money, if
the use competed directly with the producer's authorized products and served
as a disincentive to the creation of such products.
Conley et al., supra note 23, 1 88 (footnote omitted).
48. H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997). This proposal originated from a bill sponsored
by Rep. Coble. House Bill 2652 garnered five cosponsors before passing the House, as
amended, by voice vote on May 19, 1998. Sen. Grams introduced House Bill 2652 to the
Senate on July 10, 1998 as Senate Bill 2291. Collections of Information Antipiracy Act,
S.2291, 105th Cong. (1998).
49. H.R 2652, § 3.
50. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(2)).
51. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1202).
52. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1204).
53. Conley et al., supra note 23, 1 89 ("H.R. 2652 departed from the EU model in
imposing no time limit on the protection."). Once a database obtained protection, its
protection would extend indefinitely.
54. H.R. 2652, § 3 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1206). Injunctive relief and
impoundment would not be available against the federal government. Id.
55. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1207).
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ate rejected it.5 6 To explain the Senate's disapproval, one commentator
focused on three problems with the proposal: (i) its broad scope, (ii) its
lack of a sufficient exception for educational and research uses of other57
wise protected data, and (iii) its potential for perpetual protection.
• First, the bill contained the term "collection of information," defining
"information" as "facts, data, works of authorship, or any other intangible
'
material capable of being collected and organized in a systematic way. "58
The problem was that almost "anything could be defined as a collection of
information, and since there is no time limit to the protection, there will be
perpetual protection beyond the recoupment of investment. Such an idea
conflicts with the values of a free market economy."5 9 Second, despite an
apparent exception from liability for some educational and research uses,
the bill's specific exception for not-for-profit scientific or research uses did
not apply where the use "harm[s] the actual or potential market for the
product." 60 Thus, provisions of the bill render useless the immunity for
educational, scientific, and research uses where such uses cause harm, and
arguably, all unauthorized uses cause actual or potential harm to the
database owner. 6 1 Third, the failure to specify a duration for protection
62
creates the possibility of perpetual privileges.
3.

Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act (House Bill 354)

The 106th Congress considered the Collections of Information Anti-Piracy
Act, 6 3 which, like House Bill 2652, would amend the Copyright Act by
adding a new chapter. The proposal contained the following
characteristics:

56. Julius J. Marke, Database Protection Bills Pending in Congress, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 17,
1999, at 5. "The House passed H.R. 2652 in May 1998, and then passed it again as part
of the House version of what was to become the Digital Millenium [sic] Copyright Act.
However, the Senate deleted the provisions of H.R. 2652 from the DMCA before both
houses passed that legislation in October 1998." Conley et al., supra note 23, 1 90.
57. John Tessensohn, The Devil's in the Details: The Questfor Legal Protection of Computer Databasesand the Collections of InformationAct, H.R. 2652, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH.
439, 471-73 (1998).
58. H.R. 2652, § 3 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(2)).
59. Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 471. In other words, the broad scope combined
with the unlimited duration creates too much protection unnecessarily.
60. H.R. 2652 § 3 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1203).
61. Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 472.
62. Id. at 473.
63. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999). Representative Howard Coble introduced this
bill.
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The Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act House Bill 354
Source

Scope

Rights

Exceptions

Duration

Remedies

The proposal would create a sui generis right protecting non-creative databases
by expanding the Copyright6 4Act with a Chapter called "Misappropriation of
Collections of Information."
Protection would apply to (1) factual databases that were (2) created and
maintained by a substantial
monetary investment or other resources and (3)
65
used in commerce.
The statute would prohibit (1) the extraction of all or a substantial part of the
contents of the database that (2) caused harm to the actual or potential market
of the owner.
The statute would offer lots of exceptions and exclusions such as fair use
measures for scientific, education,
and research purposes; government
66
collections; and news reporting.
The property right in the database would continue for a fifteen-year period
beginning when the database was injected into
commerce, but could restart
67
upon any significant change to the database.
The statute would prescribe civil remedies-injunctive relief; impoundment; and
monetary relief, including damages and attorneys' fees 6 -and criminal
penalties, including fines ranging
from $250,000 to $500,000 and
69
imprisonment for five to ten years.

Although this bill was nearly identical to its predecessor, it included a
fair use exception 70 and provided a fifteen-year limit to protection. Under
this regime, Micromedex could protect its Poisindex database from piracy
if the pirate copied and exploited a substantial portion of the database's
factual content. Congress did not take action on this proposal.
4.

Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act (H.R. 1858)

Legislators also considered the Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act. 7 1 This proposal "features a relatively narrow prohibition that is
aimed mainly at preventing wholesale misappropriation of databases,
prohibiting duplication that produces a database that is 'substantially the
same' as the first."72 The bill may be summarized as follows:

64. Id. § 2.
65. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402).
66. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. §§ 1403-1404). See infra Part III for further discussion
of these exceptions.
67. H.R. 354, § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1408(c)); see Marke, supra note 59, at 5.
68. H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1406). Injunctive relief and impoundment

are not
69.
70.
71.
72.

available against the federal government. Id.
Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1407).
See supra note 13.
H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999). Representative Tom Bliley introduced this bill.
Harvey Berkman, Congress Tackles DatabaseLaw, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1999, at B1.
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The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act: House Bill 1858
Source
Scope

Rights

Exceptions

Duration
Remedies

The proposed statute would protect some databases from misappropriation.
Protection would apply to (1) collections of facts collected and organized in a
single place, (2) through the investment of substantial monetary or other
resources, and (3) for the purpose of roviding access to those discrete items of
information by users of the database
The statute would prohibit the extraction of information from a database: (1) to
create a new database that is substantially the same as the original database, (2)
to sell or distribute to the public the new database, or (3) to sell or distribute
in
74
commerce the new database in competition with the original database.
The statute would have numerous exceptions and exclusions such as collecting
or using information obtained through other sources; news reporting; law
enforcement and intelligence activities; scientific, educational, or research
uses; 75 government information; databases related to Internet communications;
76
computer programs; and individual facts, ideas, and related concepts.
Thig form of protection has no durational limit.
Only the Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction to bring an action against
an entity for violating the statute. The statute77mentions no remedies except in
the context of securities market information.

Unlike the other proposals, House Bill 1858 only protected the
database if the pirate creates a new database that is substantially the same
as the old one. Thus, under this regime, Micromedex could only protect its
database from wholesale copying. Moreover, this proposal offered little
chance for increasing the protection of U.S. databases from international
78
piracy.
II.

The International Framework for Database Protection

Strictly speaking, there is no international copyright law. 79 Rather, the
international framework for copyright protection consists of the national
73. H.R. 1858, § 101.
The term 'database' means a collection of discrete items of information that have
been collected and organized in a single place, or in such a way as to be
accessible through a single source, through the investment of substantial
monetary or other resources, for the purpose of providing access to those
discrete items of information by users of the database. However, a discrete
section of a database that contains multiple discrete items of information may
also be treated as a database.
Id.
74. Id. § 102.
This summary is derived from the definition of "a duplicate" in Section 101 and
the statement "[i]t is unlawful for any person, by any means or instrumentality
of interstate or foreign commerce or communications, to sell or distribute to the
public a database that (1) is a duplicate of another database that was collected
and organized by another person; and (2) is sold or distributed in commerce in
competition with that other database.
Id. §§ 101-102.
75. Id. § 103(d).
76. Id. §§ 103-104.
77. Id. §§ 107, 201.
78. See infra Part III.B.
79. See generally Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in International Copyright, 16
Cwaozo ARTS & ETrr. I.J. 369 (1998) (describing international law related to
copyright).
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laws between countries, which are linked through formal treaties, trade
agreements, and regional agreements. 80 Generally, this framework provides no more protection for non-creative databases than present copyright
law in the United States. Although the European Union adopted a regional
agreement in 1996 that created a regime for protecting non-creative
databases by engendering a sui generis right in such databases, 8 ' no international instrument protects non-creative databases made in the United
States.
A. International Copyright Treaties and Related Trade Agreements
1.

Berne Convention

Chief among treaties linking national copyright laws is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention or
Berne). 8 2 The Berne Convention dates back to 1886 and currently consists of more than 130 member countries.8 3 The World Intellectual Propagency of the United Nations, now
erty Organization (WIPO), a specialized
84
administers the Berne Convention.
Historically, the Berne Convention played a major role in harmonizing
national copyright laws by requiring that each member recognize certain
minimum standards of protection. 8 5 However, there are at least three
problems with using the Berne Convention to protect non-creative
databases.
First, although the Berne Convention protects collections, 86 itfails to
80. Id.
81. See infra Part II.B.
82. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 14,
1967, art. 2(5), (8), S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, revised July 24,
1971, amended Oct. 2, 1979 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Another multilateral treaty
is the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), which was created in the 1950s. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter
UCC]. This treaty was designed mainly as a bridge between the Berne Union and the
United States, which did not become a member of the Berne Convention until 1989.
CHRISTOPHER REES & SIMON CHARLTON, DATABASE LAW 133 (1998). But since the United
States is now a member the Berne Convention, the UCC is no longer important. Moreover, the Berne Convention enjoys supremacy over the UCC. UCC, supra, art. XVII; Alexander A. Caviedes, internationalCopyright Law: Should The European Union Dictate Its
Development?, 6 B.U. INT'L LJ. 165,172 (1998).
83. REES & CHARLTON, supra note 82 at 129.
84. W. Matthew Wayman, International Database Protection: A Multilateral Treaty
Solution to the United States' Database Dilemma, 37 SANTA Ct.ARA L. Rav. 427, 446
(1997).
85. In particular, the Berne Convention requires that member countries provide: (1)
copyright owners and authors with a set of minimum rights; (2) restrictions on the
scope of permissible limitations and exceptions; (3) a minimum term of protection for
the life of the author plus fifty years; (4) a prohibition on formalities as a condition for
enjoying rights; (5) retroactive protection for existing works in which copyright has not
expired; and (6) "national treatment." National treatment prohibits a country from providing less favorable treatment to foreigners than to its own citizens with respect to intellectual property laws. Perlmutter, supra note 79.
86. Article 2(5) provides protection for collections of works to the extent that the
selection and arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations. "It is argua-
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protect both creative and non-creative databases. Berne seeks to protect
and promote the international rights of authors, but it expressly excludes
from protection "news of the day [and] ... miscellaneous facts having the

character of mere items of press information."8 7 In short, it provides no
protection for U.S. databases abroad.
Second, even if the Berne Convention included protection for
databases, a U.S. database maker could only expect protection equivalent
to the Berne Convention's minimum standard, regardless of whether the
United States provided a much higher level of protection. 88 National treatment does not entail reciprocal treatment. Moreover, countries with few
databases are likely to adopt the absolute minimum amount of protection,
which may be insufficient for a U.S. citizen to enforce her rights under U.S.
89
law in those countries.
Third, if the Berne Convention included a high level of protection for
databases, a victim of piracy still can only enforce her rights outside her
own country through an action in the foreign country's courts. 90 In other
words, the Berne Convention provides no impartial forum for addressing
international copyright complaints. Although a Berne Convention member
is obligated under the treaty to apply its own law to foreigners, a violation
of the Berne Convention carries no consequences. 9 1
Although the Berne Convention offers no protection of databases at
present, some commentators suggest ways in which the Berne Convention
could be amended to protect non-creative databases. 92 Today, any modification of the Berne Convention, or any other treaty for increasing database
protection, would occur through WIPO.
2.

WIPO Copyright Treaty and Proposal

In 1996, members of WIPO adopted the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WIPO
Treaty), 93 which "introduced new international rules to clarify the interpretation of existing intellectual property rights"9 4 without derogating any
provision in the Berne Convention. 95 Significantly, the WIPO Treaty specifically addresses compilations of data and provides the following regime
for database protection.
ble whether 'protection for collections of works' can be interpreted to include protection
of compilations of facts or data." Wayman, supra note 84, at 446 n.151.
87. Berne Convention, supra note 82, art. 2(8).
88. This protection derives from the minimum standards set by Berne. Id. arts. 5,
11, 12, 14.

89. National treatment may create a disincentive for some countries to provide
strong national laws protecting databases. Indeed, a country would only want to protect
its databases to the extent necessary to protect it from copying by its own citizens.
90. Rmes & CHARLTON, supra note 82 at 139.
91. Perlmutter, supra note 79, at 372- 73.
92. See Wayman, supra note 84, at 446.
93. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. Tm.ATr Doc. No. 105-17, 36
I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Treaty].
94. REFs & CHARLTON, supra note 82, at 138.
95. WIPO Treaty, supra note 93, art. I, § 2
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Protection of Databases under the WIPO Treaty of 1996: Present
Source
Scope
Rights
Exceptions

Duration
Treatment
Enforcement
Remedies

The WIPO Treaty is an9international
intellectual property treaty endorsed by
6
roughly 160 countries.
Protection applies to compilations of data, which, by reason of the
9 7 selection or
arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations.
In addition to having the moral rights of the author, the database author has
the exclusive right to reproduce, translate, adapt, and broadcast the database.
The rights under the WIPO Treaty are limited by numerous exceptions,
including: daily news, quotations from published works, allowance of
exceptions for government information, public lectures, and educational
purposes.
Protection continues for the life of the author plus fifty years.
The WIPO Treaty requires national treatment among members.
A victim of piracy may only enforce her rights outside her own country
through an action in the foreign country's courts.
A victim of piracy may only seize infringing copies in the member country
where the infringing copies are distributed or sold.

Because the WIPO Treaty requires creativity, it affords no greater protection to databases than the current U.S. Copyright Act. Moreover,
although the WIPO Treaty theoretically protects creative databases, it suffers the same problems as the Berne Convention. Since the WIPO Treaty
merely requires protection of creative databases, a U.S. database maker
could only expect this low level of protection from a foreign Treaty member
regardless of whether the United States provided a much higher level of
protection. In addition, even if a U.S. citizen manufactured a database falling within the scope of protection afforded by a WIPO member, she could
only enforce her rights in the courts of the country where infringement
occurred. Moreover, the WIPO Treaty provides no penalties if the country
ignores her rights.

Although WIPO contemplated adding protection of non-creative
databases-in 1996 and 1997-through an amendment to the Berne Convention or through an entirely new instrument, 98 lingering problems with
enforcing rights and obtaining sufficient remedies cast doubt over whether
the changes could give U.S. database makers sufficient international protection against piracy. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 99 solves some of these concerns.
96. There are nearly 160 member nations of WIPO, including the United States and
all fifteen Member States of the European Union. Wayman, supra note 84, at 446.
97. WIPO Treaty, supra note 93, art. V.
98. In 1996, WIPO hosted a diplomatic conference to consider several proposals
including the Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provision of the Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference
(WIPO Proposal). Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provision of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference,
WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). The conference did not adopt the proposal,
but it adopted a resolution to continue work toward a treaty on database protection.
Recommendation Concerning Databases, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/100 (Dec. 23, 1996);

REEs & CHARLTON, supra note 82, at 138.
99. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Part
II, § 1, art. 10(2), LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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TRIPS is the most important of several trade agreements that now contain
copyright provisions. 0 0° Visionaries in the area of intellectual property
recognized that the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)' °1
could help curb intellectual property piracy and force further uniformity
among national intellectual property laws because GATT can impose trade
sanctions on delinquent countries. 10 2 As a result of the Uruguay round of
GATT negotiations, which began in 1985 and ended in 1994, TRIPS was
adopted in 1995.103 During the same negotiations, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was established to administer GATT, including
TRIPS. 10 4 TRIPS is now poised to revolutionize international intellectual
property rights. Whereas the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty
afforded isolated and essentially voluntary international legal protection,
nations may now protect intellectual property through trade sanctions
10 5
against infringing countries.
Generally, TRIPS incorporates the substantive norms of the Berne
Convention by direct reference. 10 6 In other words, TRIPS requires that its
members provide minimum standards of intellectual property protection
through their respective national laws. Thus, like the Berne Convention,
TRIPS includes: (1) a set of minimum rights; (2) restrictions on the extent
to which a member may limit protections; (3) a minimum term of protection for the life of the author plus fifty years; (4) a prohibition on formalities as a condition for enjoying rights; (5) retroactive protection for existing
works in which copyright has not expired; and (6) a national treatment
0
provision.' 7
However, TRIPS differs from the Berne Convention in that it: (i) augments the scope of protection,' 0 8 (ii) requires most favored nation treat100. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which became effective in
1994, also includes copyright provisions. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.
17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Perlmutter, supra
note 79, at 374.
101. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
102. RobertJ. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriageof Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?, 47
BuFF. L. REv. 713, 714 (1999). To benefit from the trade provisions in GATT, nations
must implement intellectual property laws in accordance with TRIPS. Id. at 725.
103. Id. at 714.
104. The WTO administers both the new 1994 GATT Agreement and the old 1947
GATT Agreement, to which all GATT members are subject until they become members
of the WTO by signing the 1994 GATT. See generally Caviedes, supra note 82.
105. Gutowski, supra note 102, at 715-16.
106. Article 9(1) of the TRIPS states that "[mlembers shall comply with Articles 1-21
and the Appendix of the Berne Convention (1971)." TRIPS art. 9(1). Article 2(2) states
that "[n]othing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations
that Members may have to each other under.

. .

the Berne Convention ....

."

Id. art.

2(2).
107. See discussion of the Berne Convention infra Part II.A.1.
108. Part II, Section 1 of TRIPS deals with the new subject-matter areas of computer
programs; databases; rental rights; a new term of protection; and in the area of neighbor-
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ment' 0 9 in addition to national treatment, 1 10 (iii) sets out a detailed
enforcement mechanism that countries must make available to right holders, and (iv) utilizes the WTO dispute resolution system. 1 1 ' Under this
system, a member of the WTO can request the formation of a panel to
settle a dispute over a TRIPS-related infringement claim, and the panel's
decision can be appealed to an appellate body. 112 "If a member is found
not to comply with one of its obligations, it must either implement the
obligation, provide equivalent trade concessions, or face equivalent trade
1 13
sanctions from the complaining party."
In the context of database protection, the scope of protection in TRIPS
is no different for the most part from the WIPO Treaty. Even though TRIPS
expressly protects creative databases, it specifies that its copyright protection does not extend to the data contained in compilations. To summarize,
TRIPS provides the following regime of protection for databases:
Protection of Databases under the TRIPS Agreement: Present
Source
Scope
Rights
Exceptions
Duration
Treatment
Enforcement
Remedies

TRIPS is an international trade agreement containing intellectual property
provisions.
Protection applies to (1) compilations of data (2) that by reason of 1the
14
selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations.
The database author has the exclusive right to reproduce, translate, adapt, and
broadcast the database.
The rights are limited by numerous exceptions including: daily news,
quotations from published works, allowance of exceptions for government
information, public lectures, and uses for educational purposes.
115
Protection continues for the life of the author plus fifty years.
The agreement provides national treatment and most favored nation
treatment.
The agreement requires that each WTO member provide a detailed
enforcement mechanism. Moreover, a country may enforce its rights against
another country through the WTO dispute resolution system.
A violation of TRIPS could open to the offending country to trade sanctions.

Although TRIPS fails to protect non-creative databases, such as
Micromedex's Poisindex, it offers several benefits over both the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty.
First, TRIPS may leave room for the protection of non-creative
ing rights, protection of performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasting organizations. Caviedes, supra note 82, at 168. However, TRIPS eliminates from the Berne
Convention the moral rights of the author. TRIPS art. 9(1).
109. Most favored nation treatment rules out the possibility of giving special treatment to only certain WTO members through new bilateral agreements. TRIPS art. 4.
Article 4 of TRIPS provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted
by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members." Id.
110. Id. art. 3(1).
111. WTO, Dispute Settlement Overview (last modified Jan. 13, 2000), at http://
www.wto.org/wvto/dispute/bulletin.htm.
112. Id.
113. Perlmutter, supra note 79, at 375.
114. TRIPS art. 10(2).
115. Id. art. 12.
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databases. 1 16 Article 10(2) states that even though protection does not
extend to the actual data contained in the compilations, it is "without
prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the data or material" that a member state may choose to grant protection. 1 17 Thus, if France, for example,
protects non-creative databases under its national copyright law and someone in France copies Micromedex's Poisindex, then Micromedex may
enforce the rights specified by French law via TRIPS.
Second, TRIPS supplies a possible mechanism by which a victim of
piracy can enforce her rights."18 This avoids one of the major shortcomings of the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty; if the infringing country fails to honor its TRIPS obligations, it could face costly trade
sanctions.1 19 Thus, if Micromedex's Poisindex fell within the scope of protection under TRIPS and France, a WTO member, failed to protect
Micromedex's rights, the United States would have a specific mechanism
by which to force France to comply with TRIPS.
Third, TRIPS offers a new route for adding protection to non-creative
databases. To add such protection, not only could TRIPS be amended to
include a provision that protects non-creative databases but also, since
TRIPS incorporates the Berne Convention by reference, an amendment to
the Berne Convention could accomplish the same.
In summary, although TRIPS provides the greatest international protection for databases through a multilateral treaty or trade agreement,
assuming Poisindex is a non-creative database, even TRIPS fails to offer any
protection. However, several regional agreements now extend protection to
non-creative databases.
B. EU Database Directive
In 1996, the European Union adopted the Directive on the Legal Protection
of Databases (EU Database Directive or Directive). 120 This directive provides a double layer of protection. The first layer, covering creative
databases, is grounded in copyright law, whereas the second layer, covering non-creative databases, is anchored in a sui generis right. 12 The rationale for this bipartite protection was to make it easier to provide protection
116. See TRIPS art. 10(2).
117. Id.
118. See id. Part III.
119. See id.
120. Council Directive No. 96/9, 1996 OJ. (L 77/20). On March 11, 1996, the European Union, seeing a need for more protection, promulgated Directive 96/9 Concerning
the Legal Protection of Databases, to provide copyright-like protection to databases. See
generally Sanks, supra note 22, at 996. For a summary of database protection under the
EU Database Directive, see J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COYIGHT LAw 679-94 (1998).
121. "The sui generis right was based on the Scandinavian states' 'Catalog rule' from
the 1960's, which granted to noncopyrightable compilations short-term protection
against reproduction and identical imitation." Mark Schneider, International Law and
Treaties: The EuropeanUnion DatabaseDirective, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 551, 555 (1998);
see also MichaelJ. Bastian, Note, Protection of "Noncreative" Databases:Harmonizationof
United States, Foreignand InternationalLaw, 22 B.C. Irr'L & COMP. L. REv. 425 (1999).
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for non-creative databases by avoiding any conflict with protecting certain
groups of facts in copyright law.
First, Chapter II of the Directive provides copyright protection in a
manner similar to that of the U.S. Copyright Act, the WIPO Treaty, and
TRIPS. Article 3(1) requires originality in the sense that the database must
be a collection of works or materials that by reason of their selection 122
or
their arrangement constitute an author's own intellectual creation.
However, this protection does not extend to the content of databases.
Second, Chapter III steps outside copyright law to create a sui generis
right in certain compilations of data regardless of any creative organization. The important features of this protection include the following:
Protection of Databases Under the EU Database Directive: Present
Source
The EU Database
Directive is a regional agreement that protects non-creative
12 3
databases.
Scope
Protection applies to (1) a collection of independent works, data, or other
materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means, 12 4 (2) for which the creator qualitatively or
12
quantitatively
invested substantially in obtaining, verifying, or presenting the
contentS. :)
The statute prohibits the extraction 12 6 or re-utilization 127 of the whole or of
a substantial part
128 of the contents of that database, evaluated qualitatively or
quantitatively.
Exceptions
The rights are limited by numerous exceptions for member states, including
(i) the extraction of nonelectronic databases for "private purposes"; (ii) the
extraction for teaching or scientific research, but only if proper credit is given
and the use has a noncommercial purpose; or (iii)
the extraction or re-utilization is for the purpose of public security or an administrative or judicial proce12 9
dure.
These exceptions are narrower than the similar fair use exceptions
under copyright law. For example, the sui generis right has no exceptions for
criticism, news reporting, satire, or library use. 13 0 However, the sui generis
right is not subject to compulsory licensing arrangements, even in cases where
the database compiler is the sole source of the database contents.
Duration
The property right in the database would continue for a fifteen-year period,
13 1
significant change to the database.
but this period may restart upon any
1 32
The agreement requires reciprocity.
Treatment
Enforcement Enforcement occurs through each individual country's laws, and can vary
from country to country.
Remedies
Each member state
is free to determine its remedies for the infringement of the
133
sui generis right.
Rights

122. See generally Caviedes, supra note 82.
123. The Directive requires EU members to implement the law by enacting a national
law consistent with the Directive by 1998. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 16, at
20, 27 (reviewing the implementation process in the United Kingdom).
124. Chapter Idefines "database" as "a collection of independent works, data or other
materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by
electronic or other means." Database Directive, supranote 120, art. 1. "The requirement
of independence is intended to exclude works such as a film, which literally is composed
of a collection of still frames, but in which the still frames are not independent of each
other." Conley et al., supra note 23, at l 81. Nonetheless, several commentators think
the language is ambiguous. The "language of the Directive, however, leaves the scope of
protection relatively uncertain at this time." Schneider, supra note 121, at 556.
125. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 7(1).
126. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
An "extraction" involves either the permanent oi temporary transfer of all or a
substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means
or in any form. Even the viewing of database contents on-screen constitutes an
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Micromedex's Poisindex certainty falls within the scope of the EU
Database Directive. However, since Micromedex is a U.S. database maker,
it is doubtful that it could use the Directive to protect Poisindex in EU
13 4
member countries.
In summary, the current international framework provides virtually
no international protection for U.S. non-creative databases. Neither the
Berne Convention nor the WIPO Treaty apply to non-creative databases.
Moreover, even if they did apply, neither treaty would enforce the rights of
U.S. database makers. TRIPS boasts the authority through which U.S.
database makers could enforce their rights, but it does not apply to noncreative databases. Finally, although the EU Database Directive applies
directly to non-creative databases, U.S. database makers cannot use it to
protect their investments in EU member countries because the United
States does not offer comparable protection.
III. A Compromise Proposal for U.S. Database Protection
Congress should adopt new legislation to protect non-creative databases
with an eye toward international protection. In this Part, the Note argues
three propositions. First, although many commentators oppose any added
protection for databases, not only is additional protection more innocuous
than commentators threaten but also some form of protection is warranted
to stimulate the innovation of useful databases. Second, both House Bill
354, which would give strong protection modeled on the EU's sui generis
right, and House Bill 1858, which would give weak protection based on
misappropriation law, harbor major shortcomings. Not only does House
Bill 1858 fail to provide sufficient domestic protection for U.S. databases
but also fails to procure needed international protection for U.S. database
action subject to authorization by the rightholder because it involves the transfer
of all or a substantial part of the contents to another medium.
Schneider, supra note 121, at 559.
127. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 7(2)(b). "'Re-utilization' means any
form of making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a
database by the distribution of copies, by renting, or by other forms of transmission,
including on-line." Schneider, supra note 121, at 559.
128. This right is much broader than it would at first appear, since the EU Database
Directive expressly provides that the repeated and systematic extraction or re-utilization
of insubstantial parts of a database may amount to the extraction or re-utilization of a
substantial part. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 7(5). One commentator points
out that "[tihis is an important distinction, since the typical use of a database involves
this very type of access." Conley et al., supra note 23, cl 83.
129. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 9.
130. Conley et al., supra note 23, c184.
131. Database Directive, supra note 120, at art. 10(1)-(3). Article 10 establishes a
term of protection for the sui generis right of fifteen years after the January of the year
following the date when the database was first made available to the public or when any
substantial change is made to the database. Id.; see also Sanks, supra note 22, at 999.
132. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 11; see infra Part 1II.B.l.b.
133. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 12.
134. For a detailed discussion explaining reasons U.S. database makers do not benefit from the EU Database Directive, see infra Part III.B.l.b.
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makers. House Bill 354 is flawed because it would offer too much protection for database makers. Third, a compromise proposal can be designed
to encourage the creation of innovative databases in the United States without impeding the access of data by the scientific community and the public
in general, while, at the same time, ensuring that the United States does
not fall behind other countries in the new global information-based
economy.
A. An Argument for Additional Protection
13 5
Over the past several years, many commentators and powerful lobbyists
have successfully urged Congress not to add protection for non-creative
databases. However, the argument against additional protection is
unfounded. None of the proposals give a monopoly over knowledge, alternative forms of protection are inadequate, and there is no constitutional
bar to new protection.
1. The Argument for ProtectingNon-creative Databases
Some form of U.S. legislation protecting non-creative databases is necessary: (a) to create an incentive for private compilers to make useful
databases; (b) to ensure that someone is accountable for the accuracy of
data in databases; and (c) to protect U.S. economic interests in a global
information economy.
a. To Create an Incentive to Invest in New Databases
Without some form of protection, there is no incentive for individuals or
companies such as Micromedex to take on the arduous and expensive task
of producing useful databases that benefit the public. 1 36 Commentators,
courts, and database companies recognize this problem. One commentator writes that
[w]ith such a thin layer of protection [provided by current U.S. law], the
threat of piracy may discourage the development of commercially valuable
databases .... Under this school of thought, the consumer is the ultimate
no one will be willing to compile the
victim of the Feist decision, because
137
data that the consumer needs.
135. Lobbyists against any added database protection include: (i) academic institutions who worry they would "be forced to pay for information that is currently free or
inexpensive," Kornblut, supra note 1, at All; (ii) the scientific community, Sanks, supra
note 22, at 993 n.19; (iii) "Internet service providers who want to keep access to
databases as free as possible, as part of their strategy to encourage people to do business
on line," Kornblut, supra note 1, at All; (iv) technology firms-for example, on-line
stockbrokers-who worry that if Congress goes for strong protection, the New York
Stock Exchange would claim its stock quotes are part of a protected database and charge

exorbitant licensing fees for each stock price, id.; and (v) libraries, including the Library
of Congress, Sanks, supra note 22, at 993 n.19.
136. Producing databases is incredibly expensive. For example, Reed Elsevier states
that its company has spent more than $650 million building Lexis-Nexis, a database of
news, legal, and business information. Ron Eckstein, The DatabaseDebate, LEGAL TIMEs,
Jan. 24, 2000, at 16, 17.
137. Wayman, supra note 84, at 434-35.
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Judge Hatchett of the Eleventh Circuit wrote in Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc.:138
The majority's holding [that denied copyright to a database] establishes a

rule of law that transforms the multi-billion dollar classified publishing'
industry from a business requiring the production of a useful directory
based on multiple layers of creative decision-making, into a business requiring no more than a successful race to a data13processing
agency to copy
9
another publisher's copyrighted work-product.
Most importantly, companies recognize the risk of investing in data
compilation. Although the Micromedex example is fictional, real cases of
database piracy exist. For example, two high-tech firms provided consumers with a database containing home listings and other information at an
Internet site. 140 The site "allowed consumers to search for properties and
real estate prices across the country, research potential new neighborhoods, find tips on selling their home, and even locate the fastest way to a
home mortgage." 14 1 Although the services were initially successful, the
success came at the expense of the National Association of Realtors (NAR):
The 700,000-plus-member organization [the NAR] says this Web site is one
of many that are stealing information from the Multiple Listing Service, the
national database of properties listed by Realtors from coast to coast. The
NAR wants to quash what they see as data pirates siphoning business from
those who worked long and hard to put the original database together. 14 2
How many companies, individuals, and organizations have to lose
their investments in databases before the entire industry recognizes the
risk and halts further investment? Some evidence already shows that "the
growth rates for both [databases and database producers] have slowed considerably in the years following the [Feist] decision, a signal of dampened
143
investment in the industry."
Technological advances exacerbate the problem. Not only is the threat
of piracy greater today than ever before, there are now more manifestations
of piracy. 14 4 The digitization of information poses special problems for
protecting intellectual property. 145 Today, pirating competitors can copy
138. 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
139. Id. at 1471 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
140. The original site, FloridaMarketPlace.com, available at http://www.newmls.com
(last visited Feb. 19, 2000), is no longer available.
141. Eckstein, supra note 136, at 16.
142. Id.
143. Russell G. Nelson, Recent Development, Seeking Refuge from a Technology Storm:
The CurrentStatus of DatabaseProtectionLegislation After the Sinking of the Collections of
InfornationAnti-PiracyAct and the Second CircuitAffirmation of Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publishing Co., 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 455 n.5 (1999).
144. See Conley et al., supra note 23, 1 10.
145. Id.
In the case of digital property, however, the temptation [to steal] is greater by
many orders of magnitude than in the instance of, say, a patent on an industrial
process or a copyrighted book. The ease with which digital property can be
located, accessed, copied, modified, and distributed is utterly without
precedent.
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entire databases within minutes and distribute them effortlessly across the
14 6
Internet.
Moreover, database makers are not only at risk to lose their investment
to pirating competitors but also to "information samaritans"-people who
extract data from a database without paying for it and make it available to
the public for noneconomic reasons. 14 7 This seemingly
innocent infringe148
ment can cost manufacturers millions of dollars.
The point is simple. Databases serving legitimate public needs may
never be realized without some economic incentive for their creation.
Moreover, no economic incentive exists without some legal means to protect databases from piracy. Since the present law lacks sufficient protection, 14 9 new legislation is needed. Following this reasoning, the current
lack of database legislation ultimately hurts consumers'5 0 and the pro151
gress of science.
b. To Enhance Accountability for Database Proprietors
An often overlooked fact is that database protection provides for the
accountability of data suppliers. Without some form of ownership in data,
data cannot be associated with specific distributors. As a result, the pro52
vider of information to a database cannot control its dissemination.1
Moreover, no mechanism exists to hold sloppy pirates accountable for providing false information. For example, a "parent browsing the Internet for
poison remedies would have no legal recourse if the pirated version of the
[Micromedex Poisindex], published without updates, revisions or accurate
instructions, [or] gave outdated medical advice." 15 3 This poses a real concern in an era where the Internet provides both true and false information
indiscernibly coexisting side-by-side. The ultimate consequence is less
accurate data in databases.
c. To Protect the U.S. Economy
Without additional protection for non-creative databases, the U.S. economy
will suffer. The Information Age requires new legal developments.
Id.
146. Nelson, supra note 143, at 455. ("[A]ll electronic databases have two things in
common: they are costly to produce, but they are easy to reproduce or copy.").
147. Bastian, supra note 121, at 429.
148. Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 482.
149. See infra Part lI.A.2.b.
150. Wayman, supra note 84, at 435.
151. Bastian, supra note 121, at 430 ("Consequently, as essential tools for improving
productivity, advancing education and creating a more informed citizenry, a lower supply of databases can have a strong impact on technological progress.").
152. Dennis R. Cronk, a realtor and President of the National Association of Realtors
stated that "[a] pirating entity has no contractual or legal obligation to the real estate
professional or consumer. There is no guaranteed protection of identity or addresses."
Tighter ProtectionAgainst Piracy of Online Data: Top NAR Legislative Priority, PR NEvswim, Jan. 19, 2000.
153. Kornblut, supra note 1, at All.
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Information is the raw material for the new economic era which we entered
upon some few short years ago.... In the Agrarian Age, the law developed
to facilitate the ownership and use of the most important asset of the time:
land. In the Industrial Age, the law developed to facilitate the ownership
and use of the chattel. So, in the Information Age, we should expect the law
to develop to address the use of information,
and in doing so to consider
1 54
whether it can indeed be owned at all.

Economic analysis bears out the significance of the new global informadon-based economy: "Globally, expenditures in the information and communication technology markets exceed $1.8 trillion annually and comprise
55
six percent (6%) of aggregate global Gross Domestic Product."'
Moreover, in this Information Age, nearly any form of data is potentially valuable. This includes business data (e.g., stock quotes, mutual
fund reports, Securities and Exchange Commission filings); legal and government data (e.g., Federal, state and international court rulings, statutes,
administrative regulations, proposed legislation, voter registration records,
tax rolls); personal data (e.g., credit reports, buying preferences, student
test scores, directories, health records, home listings, customer accounts,
inventories, payrolls, the contents of art collections); scientific and technological data (e.g., the human genome, medical information); and entertainment data (e.g., sports statistics).1 5 6 Various industries in the United
States try to take advantage of the value in data, and although the sales in
such industries have decreased since Feist, annual sales of database services and products still range from $4.5 billion to $200 billion in a given
industry. 15 7 Databases play a significant role in the new global information-based economy. 1 5 8 Therefore, U.S. database protection is necessary to
keep a dominant foothold in the information market.
2.

Responding to the Opponents of Database Legislation

One commentator hypothesized that since "the information industry is
growing explosively under the present dispensation," no real need for legislation protecting non-creative databases exists.15 9 "[All the evidence suggests it ain't broke, so don't fix it."' 1 60 This myopic view of the database
dilemma misses two major points. First, even if the U.S. database industry
is surviving under the current lack of legal protection, it indisputably suf154. REEs & CHARLTON, supra note 82, at 1.
155. Conley et al., supra note 23, 111. "By 1997, such expenditures had escalated
forty percent (40%) over 1992 levels." Id. '1 1. Moreover, "revenues for the computer
database industry have grown continuously at exponential rates, increasing from $9
billion to $19.2 billion between 1990 and 1994." Wolken, supra note 6, at 1267-68.
156. Nelson, supra note 143, at 453.
157. The businesses profiting from data include the publishing industry and related
services, newspapers, books and magazines, data processing and preparation, network
services, business information suppliers, electronic delivery of business information,
information retrieval services and commercial nonphysical research. Nelson, supra note
143, at 453 n.1.
158. For figures on the international information industry, see supra Part II.
159. Conley et al., supra note 23, 11 110.
160. Id.
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fers from a lack of protection. Fewer private investors and companies are
willing to take on the risks associated with producing expensive, yet unprotected databases. Second, the present success of the U.S. database industry is not an indication of the industry's health at the international level.
Only a comparison between the United States and countries that protect
their databases through legislation could alleviate worries at the international level, showing that the United States is not falling behind these countries. The suggestion that things are not so bad is shortsighted.
But opponents to U.S. database legislation also claim that (a) any legislative protection will create a monopoly over knowledge and will have
long-term negative effects on science and public welfare, (b) any legislative
protection is unnecessary because alternative forms of nonlegislative protection are available and adequate, and (c) stronger forms of legislative protection of non-creative databases are unconstitutional. Each argument is
flawed.
a. Database Protection Will Create a Hazardous Monopoly over
Knowledge
Many commentators claim that any additional database protection, especially strong protection modeled on the EU's sui generis right, will indirectly hurt public access to information and impede the progress of
science. 16 1 The argument runs as follows. Creativity relies on a rich public domain of information because "[c]ulture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, [where] each new creator [builds] on the works of
those who came before." 16 2 Increased protection in databases will allow a
private monopoly over knowledge, and "[d]atabase producers would be
able to restrict access to information ... which would increase the cost of
research .... '163 Consequently, higher prices for using data will keep
information from scientists and the public. 16 4 Although the argument for
a sui generis right is logically valid, it is not sound for these reasons.
This argument against additional legislation contains three false
assumptions. The above argument: (i) assumes that data, scientific or otherwise, will only be available through protected databases, which is either
false or too speculative to warrant consideration; (ii) assumes incorrectly
that a particular item of data must be tied only to a single database, which
is false because all legislative proposals leave room for new database makers to create databases from scratch even though the final product is identical to a database already protected by legislation; and (iii) assumes
numerous exceptions and additional legal remedies, such as antitrust laws,
would not preclude the possibility of debilitating monopolies over data.
161. See generally Tessensohn, supra note 57.
162. Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 489.
163. Nelson, supra note 143, at 464; see alsoJ.H.Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database
Protection at the Crossroads:Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. .J. 793, 809 (1999).
164. "The Commerce Committee ... would block consumer access to information."
Robert MacMillan, Consumers Groups Seek Death for DatabaseBill, NEWSBYrEs, Nov. 17,
1999.
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If data are available through their original source, such as an individual researcher or a scientific article, then increased database protection
will not block information from scientists and the public. Moreover, every
indication suggests that data will continue to be available through their
original source even if databases obtain added legislative protection.
Several commentators claim that "[tihe database industry is heavily
characterized by sole source data providers," where "'[s]ole source data' is
defined as data that cannot be independently created, collected or obtained
from any other source. 1 65 This claim is unsupported.' 66 Database compilers must obtain information from original sources, and these original
sources will not disappear just because a database incorporates data from
them. 167 Admittedly, there is the long-term possibility that if databases
obtain legislative protection and become lucrative investments, database
compilers may solicit data directly from researchers and original sources
to preclude access to the data except through their database. In this case,
the monopolistic effects of added protection could become real. However,
this is presently not the case, and to suggest otherwise is speculative.
Furthermore, even in the worse case scenario, where a database provider is the sole source of a set of data, one must compare the cost of this
situation with the value of knowing where to access the data. It is too
simple to compare the case where data is tied to a monopoly and the case
where data is free. Databases provide a more recognizable warehouse
through which people may find data, and this convenience should be factored into the analysis. Data that is undiscoverable is useless to the public.
Second, if data are available through multiple databases, then presumably there exists competition, which will drive down the exorbitant prices
anticipated by the opponents to legislation. Further, under every legislative proposal for protecting non-creative databases, any person is able to
create a database from the original sources or from scratch without violating the law, even if the new database is identical to one legislatively protected. 168 In other words, any database monopoly is intrinsically limited
because competitors can go through the same procedure of compiling the
165. Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 478 nn.171-72 (citing Hearing on H.R. 2652 Before
the House Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1997) statement ofJ.H. Reichman, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University), at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
41121.htm).
166. Not only is this speculative, but as Reichman himself admits, databases involve
downstream uses of data-they involve completely digested data. Reichman & Uhlir,
supra note 163, at 816-17. Thus, there will always be journal articles and other undigested sources of information containing the same data that in the public domain.
167. A surprisingly high number of commentators argue that the data in scientific
experiments cannot be recreated except at a high cost. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note
163, at 807-08, 835. But this observation is irrelevant because the journal articles and

experiments themselves remain available to other scientists.
168. E.g., H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(c)) (stating

"[n]othing in this chapter shall restrict any person from independently gathering information or using information obtained by means other than extracting it from a collection of information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the
investment of substantial monetary or other resources").
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rough data to create an identical database. 169
Third, added protection will not cause the demise of science because
counter-balancing legal doctrines exist. Not only does every proposal for
added protection include numerous exceptions to protect researchers and
the public in certain
contexts 170 but also antitrust laws may address
171
problems that arise.
In summary, no foundation exists for the argument that new legislative protection of non-creative databases will create a monopoly over
knowledge and will have long-term negative effects on science and the public. Moreover, the manifesto echoing among anti-protection lobbyists that
database legislation will allow the ownership of facts 172 is folly. The only
logical conclusion following from the opponent's argument is that data
within a given databasewill be restricted, not that data themselves will be
restricted. Ideally, added protection will encourage the investment and creation of novel databases, adding optionalresources for researchers. Even if
access through the new databases brings a price, it is better than no
database at all. Opponents to database legislation are unrealistic to expect
the best of both worlds.
b. Alternative Forms of Protection Already Exist to Protect Non-creative
Databases
A second type of argument made by opponents to database legislation is
that adequate alternative forms of protection are available.' 73 In particular, opponents argue that either (i) contractual protections, (ii) technological protections, or (iii) state misappropriation laws will suffice to protect
175
database investments1 74 Each suggestion is misguided.
169. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 163, at 817-18. In response to this argument, one
opponent to database legislation comments that "many databases cannot be recreated
from scratch. Data that are time-sensitive, unique, very old, or prohibitively expensive fit
this description. In research, this includes virtually all observational data sets of transient natural phenomena, as well as data from very costly or labor-intensive experiments." Id. However, the fact that the process of compiling information is expensive
does not mean that other ambitious entrepreneurs could not legally re-create any
database from scratch. Critics of database protection want the best of both worlds; they
want companies to invest millions of dollars to develop databases, and they also want to
take advantage of this free labor.
170. See supra Part I.B.
171. Note that the provisions of the EU Database Directive "are without prejudice to
the application Community or national competition rules." STERLING, supra note 120, at
680. Moreover, under H.R. 354, "Nothing in this chapter shall limit in any way the
constraints on the manner in which products and services may be provided to the public
that are imposed by Federal and State antitrust laws, including those regarding single
suppliers of products and services." H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1405(d)). But
see Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 480
172. Eckstein, supra note 136, at 16. Eckstein quotes Kevin Sheekey, Bloomberg
Financial Markets' Washington representative, as saying "[ilf
we allow people to own
facts, at best we are putting a tollbooth onto the free flow of information and the
Internet. At worst, we are building a dam." Id.
173. E.g., Wayman, supra note 84, at 436.
174. Sanks, supra note 22, at 1010.
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First, "[a]fter Feist, database owners strengthened their contractual
protections by restricting the manner in which the database is used. For
example, databases accessed through the Internet may contain restrictions
for downloading and redistributing the database's contents."' 7 6 Moreover,
licensing arrangements look even more promising in light of a recent court
decision holding that licensing agreements are not pre-empted by the Copyright Act. 177 Thus, "[alithough the copyright law itself will not protect
the facts contained in a database, database providers can use shrink-wrap
or click-wrap licenses to limit the access to and copying of the information
178
in their databases."'
However, there are numerous problems with relying on licensing
agreements to protect databases. First, database owners have no reasonable means to monitor or police such agreements. 179 Second, even though
U.S. courts suggest that licensing agreements are not pre-empted by the
Copyright Act, no guarantee exists that the typical shrink-wrap contract
will be held enforceable by all courts. The ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg'8 0
"decision is not ...a guaranty that contractual limits on the use of massmarketed databases will be uniformly enforceable."' 81 Third, "for many
database proprietors, it will be impossible to obtain assent to restrictive
contracts, or inconsistent with their business objectives."' 8 2 Fourth, remedies available for the breach of an agreement are inconsequential compared
to copyright infringement remedies and remedies contemplated by legislative protection. 18 3 And fifth, the costs associated with monitoring, draftAnother option is to develop a more creative method of putting the database
together to meet the Feist minimum level of creativity requirement .... [But
d]atabase owners perceive that creativity will add costs to development, while
end users do not want the additional, potentially irrelevant information. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that this creative approach will actually yield
copyright protection.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
175. Some commentators suggest that alternative forms of protection will be more
successful for certain kinds of databases. Conley et al., supra note 23, [33.
176. Sanks, supra note 22, at 1008 (footnotes omitted).
177. ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). "A copyright is a
right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, severally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create exclusive rights." Stone &
Pernick, supra note 30, at 19.
178. Stone & Pernick, supra note 30, at 20.
179. Sanks, supra note 22, at 1008 ("Because the information does not physically
reside with the database owner once copied, the database owner has no way to insure
that the licensing agreement is honored.").
180. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
181. Conley et al., supra note 23. "Notwithstanding the decision in Pro-CD, it appears
that the jury is still out as to whether shrink-wrap licenses can be used to protect computer databases in light of the conflicting views of the various circuits." Tessensohn,
supra note 57, at 457.
182. Conley et al., supra note 23, c 70.
183. Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 458.
Principally, while specific enforcement of a contract is rarely available in action
for breach, injunctive relief is standard in copyright infringement suits and operative throughout the country. Furthermore, a plaintiff in a breach of contract
actions must prove damages, whereas copyright law provides statutory damages
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ing, and enforcing such agreements makes data more expensive for the
public and researchers to access. In short, more contracts cannot solve the
database dilemma.
Second, opponents to added protection argue that technological protections 18 4 sufficiently fortify databases against pirates, but such protections are insufficient. First, "if database owners must resort to a
185
technological solution, the cost of developing databases will increase."
Second, even if encryption technology was sufficiently advanced, which it
is not, it "cannot protect databases once the contents are printed."1 86 In
summary, most commentators agree that "[dlespite their sophistication,
self-help technological approaches like these have not eliminated the
demand for legal protections. In some contexts, they are technologically
infeasible. In other situations, they would impose a burden on existing
and potential users that would be unacceptable from a business
87
perspective."'
Third, opponents to added database protection sometimes suggest
that current state misappropriation laws provide sufficient civil remedies
against pirates. 18 8 The doctrine of misappropriation arises out of International News Service v. Associated Press, where the Supreme Court held that a

news agency could not reprint news gathered by another agency. 18 9 Several commentators suggest that this doctrine could be used to protect
databases. 190 However, at present, there is no reason to think courts are
willing to expand the doctrine to cover databases. First, the doctrine
applies narrowly to "hot news"-time-sensitive information, not scientific
research archives. 19 1 Second, the test for applying this judicial doctrine is
simply too uncertain for database makers to rely on it. 19 2 Third, "[u]nfair
and the possibility of an award of costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing
party.

Id.
184. Technological protections include encryption technology. For a detailed discussion of current technological devices for protecting the content of databases, see Conley
et al., supra note 23, 1 26-33.
185. Sanks, supra note 22, at 1009.
186. Id.
187. Conley et al., supra note 23, 33.
188. Fair Use of Databases, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 15, 1999, at A26 ("Databases already
enjoy some protections. Many states have misappropriation laws that can be used to bar
database piracy, while federal copyright law affords protection to the expression, selection and arrangement of facts within a database, but not, it must be stressed, to the facts

themselves.").
189. 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
190. Fair Use of Databases, supra note 188, at A26.
191. Bastian, supra note 121, at 451.
Not surprisingly, the most recent definition of misappropriation, set forth by the
Second Circuit in National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., interprets INS
v. AP narrowly. The Second Circuit reasoned that INS v. AP should be held to
its facts owing to a lack of an analytic underpinning for the doctrine of
misappropriation.
Id. "Unfortunately, most databases are usually archival in nature and not 'hot news."'
Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 462.
192. Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 463.
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competition and misappropriation remedies are likely to face preemption"
by the Copyright Act. 193 In short, the unfounded suggestion that current
misappropriation laws can protect databases is wishful thinking.
Therefore, although current contractual, technological, and state misappropriation protections provide hints of security to database proprietors,
they offer only the faintest hope of protecting huge investments in data
compilation and maintenance.
c. Database Protection Is Unconstitutional
A third argument commonly offered against stronger forms of legislative
protection for databases' 94 is that such legislation is unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court has already held in Feist that labor alone cannot supplant
the creativity requirement. 195 This argument is hardly worth mentioning
because legislators claim that any new database protection would fall
19 7
under the Commerce Clause 19 6 if not the Intellectual Property Clause.
In fact, even if new legislation is manifested as an amendment to the Copyright Act, the fact that the Commerce Clause, not the Intellectual Property
Clause, license it is insubstantial. 198 Provisions in the Copyright Act need
not rest on the Intellectual Property Clause.
Beyond the obvious need for some form of added protection for noncreative databases, opponents to added protection offer no cogent reason
not to provide such protections. Therefore, the issue turns to which form
of legislation is most suitable for resolving the database dilemma at the
national and international levels.

193. Conley et al., supra note 23, c[70.
To survive [preemption], such remedies cannot be merely 'copyright like' causes
of action, but must include extra elements such as time-sensitivity of the data or
free-riding. However, what many database proprietors really want is precisely
what the preemption doctrine forbids: a simple prohibition against copying
compilations that are insufficiently original for copyright purposes.

Id.
194. The argument does not apply to weaker forms of database protection modeled
on misappropriation law such as H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
195. See Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: DelimitingDatabaseProtection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause and the FirstAmendment, 17
C~ARozo ARTs & Ewr. LJ. 47 (1999).
196. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
197. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Nelson, supra note 143, at 474-75.
198. A few commentators suggest that database protection would violate the First

Amendment.
For some forty years, the late Professor Melville Nimmer, a leading authority on
both copyright and First Amendment law, taught that copyright protection
would violate First Amendment guarantees of free speech were it not for the
judicial exclusion of ideas and facts from the reach of the exclusive property

rights granted to authors and artists.
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 163, at 833.
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B. The Problem with the Current Legislative Proposals
Both of the recent legislative proposals for added protection, House Bill
1858 and House Bill 354, contain major shortcomings. While House Bill
1858 is too weak, House Bill 354 is unnecessarily strong.
1. The Problem with House Bill 1858
At present, the misappropriation approach to database legislation receives
much support' 9 9 as a reasonable alternative to the strong forms of protection characteristic of early U.S. legislative proposals and House Bill 354.
Nonetheless, House Bill 1858 contains serious flaws. House Bill 1858 is
problematic because (a) it offers little or no real protection for database
compilers in the United States, and (b) it neglects to create important international protections for U.S. database makers by failing to provide protection comparable to that outlined in the EU Database Directive.
a. Domestic Shortcomings
House Bill 1858 provides almost no real U.S. protection for database makers. Not only is the scope of protection narrow to the point of making it
trivial but also the bill leaves no mechanism through which a victim of
piracy may enforce her rights.
House Bill 1858 fails to proscribe any piracy except the most
unimaginative, wholesale copying of databases.20 0 Assuming that the
database was compiled through the "investment of substantial monetary or
other resources,"2 0 1 the proposal makes it:
unlawful for any person, by any means or instrumentality of interstate or
foreign commerce or communications, to sell or distribute to the public a
database that (1) is a duplicate of another database that was collected and
organized by another person; and (2) is
20 2sold or distributed in commerce in
competition with that other database.
According to the proposal, "a database is 'a duplicate' of any other
database if the database is substantiallythe same as such other database,and
was made by extracting information from such other database." 20 3 The
language fails to cover numerous forms of piracy-like conduct.
First, a pirate could extract substantial amounts of information from a
database without violating the statute, so long as she does not ultimately
create a new database substantially similar to the original database. For
199. Bastian, supra note 121, (recommending protection based on misappropriation);
Tessensohn, supra note 57; Fair Use of Databases, supra note 188, at A26; MacMillan,
supra note 164.
200. "H.R. 1858 will simply give broad leeway to other industries to pirate and sell the
material that our companies have worked so hard to organize and bring to the marketplace." House Adjourns Without Taking Action On DatabaseProtectionLegislation, REP. oN
Dec. 1999, at Vol.9, No.12 Lams, News Library, SIMBA File (quoting Dan Duncan, vice president of government relations for the Washington-based
Software Information and Industry Association (SIIA)).
201. H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999) (defining database).
202. Id. § 102.
203. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
DiREcT oRY PUBLISHING,
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example, a pet store could simply download all of Micromedex's poison
antidotes dealing with snakes and poisonous animals and incorporate it
into a different pet-related database without violating House Bill 1858; the
final product is not substantially the same as Poisindex.
It should be noted that House Bill 1858 defines "database" such that
there may be databases within databases. The bill states that "a discrete
section of a database that contains multiple discrete items of information
may also be treated as a database."20 4 The significance of this is that
Micromedex may be able to protect discrete subsets of data, such as antidotes to animal poisons within their database. However, the bill's language
does not designate which subsets of data may constitute independently
protectable databases. Moreover, the bill's language does not prescribe
how a database proprietor may ensure the protection of these discrete subsets of data in a larger database.
Second, a large health services corporation could extract
Micromedex's entire database and escape infringement by transforming it
into a database that is not "substantially" the same as the original by simply adding data. Micromedex would lose its entire investment without
remedies under House Bill 1858.
Third, House Bill 1858 leaves the victim of piracy helpless to pursue
an action against the suspected pirate. Under the bill, the Federal Trade
Commission has the exclusive authority to bring an action, 20 5 which leaves
the decision of whether to bring an action to its discretion, with the.possibility for indefinite delays in the recovery against even an obvious case of
misappropriation. 20 6 The proposal states that "[tihe Federal Trade Commission shall have jurisdiction, under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ...

to prevent violations of section 102 of this title."' 20 7 In

short, a database provider cannot adequately protect its investment under
the bill.
b. International Shortcomings
House Bill 1858 provides no additional international protection for U.S.
database makers. This is apparent from two facts: (i) House Bill 1858
would fail to secure reciprocal sui generis protection from EU member
countries, and (ii) current international treaties and trade agreements fail
to offer any international protection for U.S. databases.
Citizens and companies in the United States cannot benefit from the
sui generis rights of EU member countries because the EU Database Directive indirectly calls for reciprocity. 20 8 Generally, "the Directive limits the
204. Id. (defining "database").
205. Id. §§ 107, 201.
206. MacMillan, supra note 164.
207. H.R. 1858 § 107(a); 15 U.S.C. 45 (1999). Though the Federal Trade Commission may prescribe additional rules, this does not help the injured victim of piracy.

H.R. 1858 § 107(b), (d).
208. This reciprocity requirement motivated U.S. legislators to consider H.R. 3531,
which was modeled closely on the sui generis right of the EU Database Directive. Sanks,
supra note 22, at 994.
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sui generis right to database makers or rightholders who are nationals of a
Member State or who have their residence in the territory of the Community."20 9 However, according to the Directive, a foreign entity may use the
EU sui generis right to protect its database in an EU member country if one
of two conditions are met. First, if the entity is a corporation or partnership, the entity must have been formed in "accordance with the law of a
Member State and have their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the Community."2 10 This provision fails
to help U.S. database makers. Second, the sui generis right applies to
databases "produced by legal persons not established in a Member State,
within the meaning of the Treaty, only if such third countries offer comparable protection to databases by nationals of a Member State or persons
211
who have their habitual residence in the territory of the Community."
In other words, individuals and entities "outside the EU... may not claim
the sui generis right unless they reside or were incorporated or formed 2in12a
jurisdiction which provides comparable protection for EU databases."
Unfortunately, the term "comparable protection" is left open to interpretation by the EU Council. In determining whether U.S. database legislation is comparable, the "EU Council may adopt a reciprocal arrangement
upon a proposal from the Commission." 2 13 Clearly, House Bill 1858
would not provide "comparable protection" and would thus fail to satisfy
the European Union's reciprocity requirement. 2 14 In short, House Bill
1858 fails to provide any added protection in EU member countries.
Second, the national treatment provisions in the Berne Convention,
the WIPO Treaty, and TRIPS fail to protect U.S. database makers. 2 15 Since
both the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty require national treatment, an EU member could not deny Micromedex copyrights provided to
its own citizens without violating the Berne Convention and the WIPO
Treaty. However, if an EU member country denied Micromedex its own
national sui generis right in databases, this apparently would not violate
the Berne Convention or the WIPO Treaty, 2 16 since both refer only to copy209. Schneider, supra note 121, at 560 (citing Article 11 of the EU Database

Directive).
210. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 11 recital 56; see also Schneider, supra
note 121, at 561. Moreover, a company having its registered office in the Community
must have operations linked on an ongoing basis with the economy of a Member State.
Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 11.
211. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 11 recital 56 (emphasis added).
212. Schneider, supra note 121, at 561.
213. Database Directive, surpa note 120, art. 11(3); see Schneider, supra note 121, at

561.
214. No country outside the European Economic Area (EEA) has obtained reciprocal
rights as of January 1, 1998. STERLING, supra note 120, at 685.
215. This is the conclusion of J.A.L. Sterling: "[l]n principle, non-EEA database makers will not be able to claim national treatment under the Directive, and their rights will
depend on the terms of [any] agreement made under Article 11(3)." Id. at 682.
216. Some commentators have misinterpreted the Berne Convention on this point.
For example, one commentator writes wrongly: "[Bly its very terms, the Berne Convention prohibits the EU from denying to other signatory states, such as the U.S. andJapan,
the protections afforded by the Database Directive's sui generis right to works within the
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rights. In other words, the sui generis right falls outside the scope of these
treaties. But even if the sui generis right fell within the scope of either
treaty, a violation of the treaty poses no consequences to an EU member
country that denied Micromedex its sui generis right. 2 17 In other words,
the treaties are doubly ineffectual for securing international database
protection.
At first blush, although TRIPS offers a different hope because it provides enforcement measures, national treatment, and most favored nation
treatment, 2 18 it nonetheless fails to supply international protection. Like
the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty, TRIPS affords no protection
under its national treatment provision. Notably, the TRIPS provision dealing directly with databases seems to encompass a copyright in non-creative
databases, which would allow Micromedex to enforce the copyright in an
EU member state. Unfortunately, the national treatment provision in
TRIPS only applies to copyright laws, not to a sui generis law protecting
databases. Again, Article 10(2) states that even though protection does not
extend to the actual data contained in the compilations, it is "without
prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the data or material" that a member state may choose to grant. 2 19 The EU sui generis right goes outside
copyright to protect databases.
The most favored nation treatment provision in TRIPS fails to apply to
the EU sui generis right for similar reasons. TRIPS provides that "any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the
nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members." 220 Although "[tihis means
that in the future, the grant of intellectual property rights cannot be based
on a requirement of reciprocity," 22 1 again, the sui generis right in the EU
Database Directive falls outside the scope of TRIPS, thus leaving TRIPS
incapable of covering database protection at the international level.
Some commentators claim that no additional international protection
is needed because U.S. databases are currently thriving without international protection. However, this claim pales in the light of several
observations.
First, U.S. companies are currently losing millions of dollars to foreign
pirates of copyrightable works. Although no data on foreign losses attributed solely to database thievery exists, "[t]he International Intellectual
Property Alliance estimated that in 1998 losses [due to piracy] were about
$5 billion for businesses. '22 2 Moreover, "for business applications, [a loss]
EU regardless of whether such signatory state provides comparable protection." Bastian,
supra note 121.
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See supra Part II.A.3.
219. TRIPS art. 10(2) (emphasis added).
220. Id. art. 4.
221. Caviedes, supra note 82, at 194.
222. Hearing on Violations of Intellectual Property Rights Before the House Subcomm. on
Int'l Econ. Policy & Trade of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. (1999) (statement
of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Republication U.S. Representative from Illinois).
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over $3 billion ... creates distortions in the market and creates parallel
black market systems which in the end will hurt, not just the [United
States], but the global economy as a whole." 2 23 In short, international
piracy is a real concern.
Second, the United States has the most to lose in the new global information-based economy because of a lack of international intellectual property protection since it is the single largest producer of database services
and products. Typically, the strongest resistance to increased international
intellectual property protection comes from countries holding the fewest
intellectual property products. The rationale for such countries is that they
have nothing to lose from little protection-they have no product to stealand everything to gain from little protection-they can steal the products of
other countries with impunity. In the case of database protection, the
United States has the most to lose and nothing to gain from a lack of international protection.
A third and related reason for international protection is that U.S.
database makers are currently at risk of falling behind foreign database
makers. Most commentators agree that without legislation comparable to
the EU sui generis right, U.S. database makers will suffer a competitive
disadvantage. 2 24 Since competing countries in the European Union and
elsewhere protect their companies' database investments, the United States
is disadvantaged in two ways. Not only can European companies succeed
where U.S. companies fail but also European companies may filch the
investments of U.S. database providers without facing penalties.
Fourth, there is little doubt that the European Union has set the
agenda for international database protection by requiring a reciprocity provision in its Database Directive. 225 In other words, although the United
States may resist increased protection for non-creative databases, they are
certainly in the minority. 22 6 Long-term resistance would come at the price
of economic isolation.
In summary, House Bill 1858 is unacceptable. Not only does it fail to
provide sufficient protection for U.S. database makers within the United
States but also it cannot extend database protection internationally. Moreover, some form of international protection is crucial to continued prosperity for U.S. database makers.

223. Id.
224. Schneider, supra note 121, at 561 (citing Anna Kraske & Thomas A. Unger, Protecting Works on CD-ROM and Internet, 2 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 8, 9 (1996)); Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 466 ("The bottom line is that many U.S. computer databases that
are worth billions of dollars may be denied protection under the EU Directive, placing
U.S. producers at a competitive disadvantage throughout the huge European

market....").

225. Schneider, supra note 121, at 561.
226. See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining U.S. resistance to the WIPO proposal).
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The Problem with H.R. 354

Unlike House Bill 1858, most commentators criticize House Bill 354.227
Although a number of the criticisms are unfounded, 22 8 House Bill 354 is
defective because it offers too much protection to U.S. database makers in
the United States. This overprotection includes: (a) the possible protection
of small databases, which could revive a form of the sole-source problem; 229 (b) possibly preventing investors from creating new databases by
combining parts of others that are protected; (c) the possibility that
database makers could force consumers to contract around exceptions to
House Bill 354; (d) an effectively perpetual term of protection; (e) potentially overcautious infringers likely avoiding data use that is otherwise
legally accessible because the exceptions to protection place the burden of
proof on the alleged infringer; and (f) the vagueness and imprecision of
terms and exceptions that may cause a chilling effect in the scientific and
academic communities.
a.

The Sole-Source Problem

Since House Bill 354 provides no guarantee that small databases are precluded from protection, original sources of data may claim protection
under the bill, thus presenting a version of the sole-source problem. The
bill provides protection to "a collection of information gathered, organized,
or maintained by another person through the investment of substantial
monetary or other resources .... -"23o The bill defines "collection of information" to mean "information that has been collected and has been organized for the purpose of bringing discrete items of information together in
one place or through one source so that users may access them." 23 1 Under
a reasonable interpretation of these provisions, it is conceivable that a
researcher combining fifty items of scientific data in a single research article could claim protection under House Bill 354. The researcher may argue
that her single article brings discrete items of information together in one
place. Moreover, the researcher may argue that because the data was
acquired through elaborate, time-consuming and expensive experiments,
the data was gathered "through the investment of substantial monetary or
other resources." 23 2 Unless an additional provision in the bill confines
protection to databases compiled from original sources, small original
sources may be monopolized.
227. For example, one commentator writes: "[T]his paper will expose the dangers of
the second initiative, The Collections of Information Act, which is currently pending in
the House of Representatives." Tessensohn, supra note 57, at 440-41.
228. For example, many commentators make sweeping claims against creating a
property right over knowledge. See supra Part III.A.2.
229. See supra Part III.A.2.
230. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402).
231. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1401).
232. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402). Hopefully, a court interpreting the statute
would restrict the "sweat of the brow" test to acquiring data from original sources rather
than from discovery itself. But there is no guarantee that courts will interpret House Bill
354 in this way.
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The Re-compilation Problem

Potentially, House Bill 354 precludes the re-compilation of data from protected databases, "balkanizing" data compilations. 233 Discussing a predecessor of House Bill 354, one commentator claimed that under strong
forms of legislative protection,
[I]ater scientists and engineers could not combine data legitimately accessed
from one commercial database with data extracted from other databases to
make a complex new database for addressing hard problems without
obtaining additional licenses and permissions. This remains, perhaps, the
single most critical problem for scientific and technical research .... No
one could combine "substantial" amounts of data or information into a
more efficient follow-on product without a license; the licensor would labor
under no duty to grant such a license; and the sole-source
provider would
23 4
not want any competition from follow-on products.
The idea is that once databases obtain protection, inventive and useful
combinations will become expensive and difficult. For example, if an epidemiologist wants to combine the data of fifty private, protected databases
in a new database to study the cause of a deadly disease, it would be prohibitively expensive to compile the new database from scratch. Moreover,
the protected databases may hold out or refuse to license the use of the
information to maintain their monopolistic position in the market. In
short, some commentators surmise that under protection like House Bill
354, data will become balkanized, impeding scientific advancement.
c.

Freedom of Contract Issues

The exceptions listed in House Bill 354-designed to protect educational,
scientific, and other uses-are less helpful than they initially appear
because database makers may be able to force consumers to contract
around these exceptions.
[Tihe ability of data providers to override by contract even the limited exceptions that the new law may grant to public-interest users, including scientists, engineers, and educators, is of great concern. Without a concomitant
duty to deal fairly and reasonably with public-interest users, these combined
powers could lead to high prices for data and to the imposition of harsh and
oppressive terms concerning both access and subsequent
uses of data that
23 5
would especially disadvantage academic researchers.
The law of contracts is not affected by the database protection provided under House Bill 354.236 Moreover, although House Bill 354
preempts state law providing equivalent rights, the bill states that "the law
of contract shall not be deemed to provide equivalent rights .... ,237
Because parties can override exceptions through contract, the exceptions
233. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 163.
234. Id. at 808-09.
235. Id. at 814-15. The author notes that although this comment is directed at a
predecessor of House Bill 354, it applies equally to House Bill 354.
236. See H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1405(a)).

237. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1405(b)).
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are less helpful than they first appear. 2 38
d. The Perpetual Duration Problem
Although House Bill 354 would create a fifteen-year term for database protection, the protection of data could effectively become perpetual. House
Bill 354 states that
[n]o criminal or civil action shall be maintained under this chapter for the
extraction or use of all or a substantial part of a collection of information
that occurs more than fifteen years after the portion of the collection that is
extracted or used was first offered for sale or otherwise in commerce, following the investment of resources that
qualified that portion of the collection
239
for protection under this chapter.
Suppose Micromedex publishes and sells its original version of
Poisindex in 2000. In 2005, Micromedex collects additional poison antidotes, adds them to Poisindex, and sells the new version. The original collection of poison antidotes would be protected until 2015, whereas the
added portion would carry protection until 2020. The problem is that even
if a user of Poisindex in 2017 knows that most of Poisindex has entered the
public domain, she probably will not be able to access and use the public
domain portion for fear *ofviolating the statute unless she can discern the
protected portions from the unprotected portions. In short, Micromedex
could effectively obtain perpetual protection of its entire database by mix240
ing protected and unprotected data.
e. Issues Related to the Burden of Proof
Since House Bill 354's "permitted acts" exception is framed in terms of a
defense, rather than an element of infringement, scientists and other users
who are intended to be exempt from liability may nonetheless avoid using
data in protected databases to avoid the possibility of costly litigation. 24 1
House Bill 354 provides a blanket exception to database protection: "No
person shall be restricted from extracting or using information for nonprofit educational, scientific, or research purposes in a manner that does
not harm directly the actual market for the product or service .... -242 In
addition, House Bill 354 provides an exception for certain limited uses or
extractions: "In general.., an individual act of use or extraction of information done for the purpose of illustration, explanation, example, comment, criticism, teaching, research, or analysis, in an amount appropriate
and customary for that purpose, is not a violation of this chapter, if it is
238. "Nothing in this chapter shall restrict the rights of parties freely to enter into
licenses or any other contracts with respect to the use of collections of information." Id.
(proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1405(e)).
239. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1408(c)) (emphasis added).
240. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 163, at 809-10.
241. Id. at 805.
242. H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(1)).
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reasonable under the circumstances." 2 43 Even if a scientist is clearly
exempt from liability under this provision, House Bill 354 places the burden of proof on the scientist to demonstrate her exempt status, rather than
the database maker to show her nonexempt status. As a consequence,
clearly exempt users may completely avoid use to avoid the mere possibility of litigation. The result is that scientists would avoid using data even
though such use is legally permissible.
f. The Problem of Indefiniteness
Any vague language or test within a statute creates uncertainty, where,
depending on the statute's interpretation, a person may or may not be held
liable. 2 44 Consequently, good conservative legal advice would recommend
staying out of clear violative conduct and conduct lying within the bounds
of uncertainty, even if such conduct is legal. Uncertainty effectively augments the domain of conduct proscribed by the statute.
House Bill 354 contains several vague terms and at least one indefinite
test. First, the expression "substantial part" in Section 1402 is vague. The
statute reads: "Any person who extracts, or uses in commerce, all or a substantialpart, measured either quantitativelyor qualitatively,of a collection of
information" may be liable provided certain additional conditions are
met.2 45 In describing certain permitted acts, the bill states clearly that the

"extraction or use of an individual item of information" does not constitute

a violation of the bill. 24 6 Moreover, the statute specifically proscribes "the

repeated or systematic extraction or use of individual items or insubstantial
parts of a collection of information so as to circumvent the prohibition"
under the general provisions of the statute.2 47 Unfortunately, the elaboration of "substantial part" ends there. Thus, Section 1402 is too ill-defined
to provide a real limitation on database protection.
Criticizing analogous language in the EU Database Directive, one commentator writes that "the risks of invoking even this exception are high,
because a would-be user has no way of knowing in advance whether a
court will later find that the amount used was in fact qualitatively or quantitatively insubstantial." 2 48 In particular, because the notion of a "collection of information" is not well-defined, 249 a clever database owner may
argue that the relevant "collection of information" consists of all the items
of information taken by the alleged pirate, whatever those turn out to be.
For example, in the case where a pet store copies all of Micromedex's
243. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(2)(A)). The bill then goes on to describe
four factors a court is to consider in determining whether an act of use or extraction is
reasonable. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(2)(a)(i)-(iv), (2)(b)).
244. Although this uncertainty is often eradicated by a rich common law interpreting
the statute, such uncertainty is always significant at the enactment of a statute.
245. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C § 1402) (emphasis added).
246. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(b)).

247. Id.
248. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 163, at 804.
249. Contra H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1401) (defining "collection of
information").
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animal poison antidotes, the pet store is liable for extracting the whole of
Micromedex's database if Micromedex can persuasively argue that the relevant "collection of information" is animal poison antidotes and not all
poison antidotes. The notion of a "substantial part" is relative to the working conception of a "collection of information." As long as a database
owner can potentially define the database in an ad hoc fashion, scientists
may shy away from even legal uses of the contents of protected databases.
Second, the expression "harm to the actual or potential market" in Section 1402 is vague. The statute states that a use or extraction of data "so as
to cause harm to the actual or potentialmarket of that other person" may be
liable, provided that certain additional conditions are met. 25 0 Unfortu-

nately, House Bill 354 does not define the type or amount of harm needed
to violate the statute. 25 1 Since a single unpaid extraction from a database
constitutes a loss of payment to the database owner, every use or extraction
potentially harms the actual market. A liberal interpretation shows that
almost any use or extraction of data from a protected database could meet
the standard. The uncertainty surrounding the language could stifle other252
wise legal uses and extractions.
Third, the expression "gathered, organized, or maintained by another
person through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources"
in Section 1402 is vague. The statute only protects a "collection of information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the
investment of substantial monetary or other resources ....-253 Again, this
expression is not defined or further explained. Until a database proprietor
successfully protects his database through litigation, there is no clear way
to know whether the statute will protect the database.
Fourth, the blanket exception for individual acts2 54 of use or extrac-

tion for "Educational, Scientific, Research, and Additional Reasonable
Uses" is too indefinite to ease anxiety among otherwise lawful users of
protected databases. The exception states that
[i]n determining whether such an act is reasonable under the circumstances,
the following factors shall be considered:
(i) The extent to which the use or extraction is commercial or nonprofit.
250. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402) (emphasis added).
251. Note that the exception in Section 1403(a) for educational, scientific, research,
and other reasonable uses states that an extraction or use in this context is violative only
if the extraction or use harms "directly the actual market for the product ...." Id.
(proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(1)). This is helpful in contexts such as nonprofit educational or scientific uses, but it does not help in other instances.
252. House Bill 354 defines "potential market." Id. Nevertheless, "would-be competitors would never know in advance when the use or extraction of protected data may turn
out to cause harm to some unknown potential market." Reichman & Uhlir, supra note
163, at 837.
253. H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402) (emphasis added).
254. For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'individual act' means an act that is
not part of a pattern, system, or repeated practice by the same party, related
parties, or parties acting in concert with respect to the same collection of information or a series of related collections of information.
Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(2)(B)).
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(ii) The good faith of the person making the use or extraction.
(iii) The extent to which and the manner in which the portion used or
extracted is incorporated into an independent work or collection, and
the degree of difference between the collection from which the use or
extraction is made and the independent work or collection.
(iv) Whether the collection from which the use or extraction is made is primarily developed for or marketed to persons engaged in the same field
2 s5
or business as the person making the use or extraction.

This exception is modeled on the Copyright Act's fair use provision,
which loosely codifies the common law exception for certain educational
and research uses of copyrighted works. Although this exception potentially provides a broad shield to nonprofit researchers and users in educational contexts, the indefiniteness of the test is likely to cause otherwise
legal users to avoid legal uses. The threat of litigation effectively chills
25 6

use.

In summary, House Bill 354 is flawed because it unnecessarily offers
too much protection for U.S. databases in the United States. It leaves
potential sole-source problems; re-compilation problems; the problem of
contracting around important exceptions; durational problems; burden of
proof problems; and problems associated with uncertainty, including
vague terms and indefinite tests. Better tailored legislation could address
these problems.
C.

A Compromise: Resolving the Database Dilemma with an Eye
Toward International Protection

U.S. database legislation must strike a balance between House Bill 1858
and House Bill 354.257 The goal in the context of database protection is to
provide enough national and international protection to encourage the
compilation of large commercial databases while leaving room for reasona255. H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(2)(A)(i-iv)). This exception also
states that:
In no case shall a use or extraction be permitted under this paragraph if the
used or extracted portion is offered or intended to be offered for sale or otherwise in commerce and is likely to serve as a market substitute for all or part of
the collection from which the use or extraction is made.

Id.
256. Note that the chilling effect may be mitigated by a provision in the civil remedies
portion of the statute. Section 1406(e) states that
[t]he court shall reduce or remit entirely monetary relief under subsection (d) in
any case in which a defendant believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her conduct was permissible under this chapter, if the defendant
was an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational, scientific, or research institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment.
Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1406(a)). This gives the court broad discretion to limit damages in such cases.
257. Indeed, as one commentator has written, "[t]he guiding principle has always
been balance: dole out only as much exclusivity as is necessary 'to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts,' but otherwise, protect the public domain." Conley et al.,
supra note 23, cl 8. This commentator went on to observe that "[airriving at a perfect
utilitarian balance between incentives for knowledge producers and access for knowledge consumers has always been the Holy Grail of intellectual property law." Id. l 93.
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bly priced data access for researchers. Congress can only meet this goal by
providing less protection than House Bill 354, the sui generis approach,
and more protection than House Bill 1858, the misappropriation approach.
1. The Compromise
Each of the problems associated with overprotection in House Bill 354 can
be mitigated by changing provisions in the bill. The provisional changes
include: (a) creating an element for infringement that targets proprietors
attempting to monopolize a sole source of data; (b) creating a compulsory
license in certain circumstances; (c) creating a limited preemption of contracts that would otherwise surrender a user's rights under the statutory
exceptions to database protection; (d) raising the standard for obtaining a
new term of protection; (e) switching the burden of proof to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant does not have an exempt status; and () creating
more definite rules through precise terms in the proposed statute and creating specific guidelines exempting certain educational, scientific, and
research uses.
a. Solving the Sole-Source Problem
To solve the sole-source problem, a provision should be added to House Bill
354 requiring, as an additional element for proving a violation of the statute, that the database-proprietor plaintiff demonstrate that the database
was not the sole source of the information extracted or used. Therefore, to
prove a prima facie case of a violation of the statute, the plaintiff would
have to show that each item in the database allegedly extracted or used was
258
publicly accessible through alternative means.
A second provision should state that if the alleged pirate used or
extracted more than seventy-five percent of the items in the database at the
time of the alleged misappropriation, then the plaintiff would have to prove
either that at least fifty percent of the items in the database were publicly
accessible 2 59 or that each item misappropriated was publicly accessible,
whichever is less. The information must be publicly accessible because,
otherwise, a database proprietor could solicit the original source, incorporate the data into her database, and therefore maintain a monopoly. Congress should define "publicly accessible" data as data the public can obtain
through reasonable diligence from a printed or electronic source that is
258. As currently written, the other elements for a prima facie case of violation for

H.R 354 include: (i) that the plaintiff was the owner or rightsholder of the database; (ii)
that the defendant extracted or used in commerce a substantial part of the database; (iii)
that the plaintiff expended sufficient money or resources to gather, organize, or maintain the database; (iv) that the use or extraction caused harm to the plaintiff's actual or
potential market; and (v) that the plaintiff offered or intended to offer in commerce the
database containing the information taken. H.R. 354 § 2.
259. Under this second provision, the plaintiff could show that any fifty percent of
the items were publicly accessible, not just those that were misappropriated. The percentages are somewhat arbitrary and should be refined to reflect any empirical information on the subject.
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open and free to the public or obtainable, as individual items of data,
through inexpensive research.
For example, federal appellate opinions and scientific articles and treatises are publicly accessible through public and private libraries. Although
some directories, such as the White Pages, are not free, the public can
2 60 It folobtain the individual items of data through inexpensive research.
lows that if the public cannot obtain the data in the database from alternative sources and cannot reproduce individual data items at a low cost, the
261
database would not gain protection.
The plaintiff's burden should not consist of showing that every item in
the database was publicly accessible. The purpose of the provision is to
ensure that the data in a protected database are available through alternative means. It is wasteful and unrealistic to expect the database proprietor
to prove that every item in a database containing 10,000 items was available through alternative means, especially if most of that data are not relevant to the data that was allegedly misappropriated. Moreover, if the
alleged pirate extracts the entire database or a substantial amount of it, the
plaintiffs failure to prove that a single item in the database was not publicly accessible would not defeat her claim. Alternatively, the plaintiff
could prove that at least fifty percent of the database was publicly accessi2 62
ble at the time of copying.
Requiring the database proprietor to prove that each item of the
database that was wrongfully extracted was available through alternative
means effectively ensures that every item in the database is available
through alternative means. Under this provision, a database user knows
either that the database is the sole source of the data and therefore not
protected, or she knows there is some other publicly accessible source for
the information. If the database user discovers data she would like to
extract, she can always look for the same data from alterative sources. If
she cannot find the data from a publicly accessible source after using reasonable diligence, she can assume that the database is the sole source of
the information and not protected. The user must make a calculated decision, but if suit is brought, the burden of proof in litigation rests on the
database proprietor to prove that the data were actually available from
260. The author draws a line between obtaining individual items of data and whole
collections of data. If obtaining an individual item of data is expensive and is not
obtainable through printed or electronic means for free, then it would not be publicly
accessible. Thus, a scientist conducting a costly'experiment and producing only ten
items of data could not protect the items under the statute. Moreover, the law would not
protect any database that is the sole source containing the items.
261. Nothing would prevent a database proprietor from buying a collection of data
from a sole-source provider and then placing each item of data in such a diffuse fashion
that a person could not obtain the data from publicly accessible sources in any convenient way. The database proprietor obtains the data as a packet-for a cost-but then
creates an inconvenience for users to obtain the data elsewhere by spreading it out over
public domain sources. Hopefully, the process of spreading out data over publicly
accessible sources is too costly for the proprietor to justify.
262. Without this provision, a user who discovers that one item of data in a large
database is not publicly accessible could take the entire database with impunity.
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alternative sources and the user failed to use reasonable diligence in
obtaining the data from those sources.
This provision imposes a significant responsibility on the database
proprietor to keep records of her data sources. However, as long as the
database proprietor keeps this record, she can ensure that her database is
protected and that she can enforce her rights in litigation. For example, a
scientist who produces a significant amount of data cannot prevent other
scientists from using the data to criticize her study by insulating the data
through this statute. 26 3 She must either provide the data through other
publicly accessible means or forego protection. Thus, Micromedex could
protect Poisindex only if the poison antidotes within it were publicly accessible through alternative means. If Micromedex can prove that the antidotes were accessible, it can stop pirates from extracting its data wholesale.
In the ideal application of these suggested amendments to House Bill
354, the database user would gain the option of paying the database proprietor for the data directly or going to a publicly accessible source to obtain
the data. Thus, the database proprietor is paid for the convenience offered
by her database, not for her access to otherwise monopolized knowledge.
b. Resolving the Re-compilation Problem
Even if the sole-source problem is resolved, database protection will still
inhibit pirates from creating new databases that combine parts of others
because of the recompilation problem. The problem is that even if the data
in a database is publicly accessible through alternative means, or can be
reproduced in an inexpensive way, a database proprietor nonetheless can
refuse to license the extraction or use of her protected database to a third
party. The proprietor may very well do this where the third party is a
direct competitor. Although the suggested solution to the sole-source problem should mitigate the effects of monopolistic protection of data, additional provisions are needed to ensure sufficient competition among
database makers and growth through new databases.
One possible solution is to add a broad provision that precludes an
apparent monopoly over data. As an example, Recital 47 of the EU
Database Directive states that "in the interests of competition between suppliers of information products and services, protection by the sui generis
right must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant position ....
" 264 This provision invokes something like a doctrine of

unfair competition to prevent unfair refusals to grant licenses on nondis263. Note that if a person tried to block any access to her data, it would be unlikely
that her data would constitute a "collection of information," even under House Bill 354.
"Collection of information" is defined as "information that has been collected and has
been organized for the purpose of bringing discrete items of information together in one
place or through one source so that users may access them." H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17
U.S.C. § 1401(1)). Such a person would be bringing the information together to support a study, not "so that users may access" the information. Id.
264. Database Directive, supra note 120, at recital 47. Recital 47 continues by stating
that "in particular as regards the creation and ditribution [sic] of new products and
services which have an intellectual, documentary, technical, economic, or commercial
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criminatory terms. For example, "in August 1997, the Court of Appeal of
Amsterdam in the Netherlands held in Denda Internationalv. KPN that a
refusal by [a Dutch company] to license its 'White Pages' telephone directories for re-publication on CD-ROM would be an abuse of a dominant market position."2 65 Although such a provision is broad enough to prevent
obvious monopolies, it lacks definiteness and leaves broad discretion to the
courts. No rational legal adviser would rely on such an exception to evade
liability. However, there is an alternative. A provision should be added to
House Bill 354 requiring a compulsory license to use an otherwise protected database in certain circumstances and under definite procedures.
Under the present version of House Bill 354, a person who wishes to use a
protected database would have to obtain a license, the terms of which
would be fixed through negotiation with the database owner. However,
under a compulsory license, a person has the right to obtain a license to
use the rightholder's work without permission, provided she follows the
2 66
statutory procedure and pays fixed royalties.
The arguments in favor of a compulsory license are that it would
reduce the transaction costs involved in licensing works through private
markets, provide a definite procedure on which users may rely to avoid
liability, enhance competition, and allow for the creation of new databases
by permitting new database compilers to incorporate data from otherwise
protected databases. Furthermore, the criticism that compulsory licenses
undermine the fundamental rights of authors does not apply in the context
of database protection where the compiler is not an author. 267
The design of a compulsory license for databases may be informed by
the four compulsory license management mechanisms contained in the
Copyright Act. 26 8 Generally, the two chief characteristics of any compulsory license system include provisions for (i) how the prospective licensee
contracts for the license either through the Copyright Office, some similar
agency, or the individual owner of the protected work, and (ii) how the
royalty payments are calculated and distributed. For example, one compulsory license under the Copyright Act requires the prospective licensee of a
protected work to provide the owner of the work with notice of her intention to obtain a compulsory license 26 9 before distributing a copy of the
work and within thirty days of actually making the copy. 270 The licensee is
added value; whereas, therefore, the provisions of this Directive are without prejudice to
the application of Community or national competition rules ....
" Id.
265. REEs & CHARLTON, supra note 82, at 24 n.4.

266. Cf. LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 285 (discussing compulsory licenses generally).
267. Cf. id. at 288 (discussing criticisms of compulsory licenses).
268. Compulsory licenses under the Copyright Act have existed since 1909, but have
evolved significantly since 1976. LEAFiER, supra note 10, at 284-89.
269. If the owner's address is unknown, the prospective user may serve the Copyright
Office. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (1999).
270. Id. The so-called Mechanical License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords
may provide guidance in the design of a compulsory license for databases. Under the
Copyright Act, this license places a limitation on the reproduction, adaptation, and distribution rights of musical copyright owners by allowing a third party to record and
distribute an otherwise copyrighted musical recording. Id.
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then required to pay the rightsholder a monthly royalty fixed by statute. 27 1
Failure to follow the statutory procedures results in infringement. This system is amenable to a context where the protected work is taken from a
single source and copied or distributed a specific number of times.
With compulsory licensing for the use of a protected database, the
prospective licensee should be able to contract with the individual owner of
the database because the licensee is taking the work from a single identifiable source. 27 2 However, determining a fair method for fixing the royalty
payment is more challenging.
Various approaches for fixing the royalty amount are available. First,
the price per item of data could be fixed by statute. The problem with this
approach is that not all data are equally valuable. Therefore, a licensee
could obtain a compulsory license for only the most valuable data, leaving
the database proprietor in a disadvantaged position with her competitors.
Second, the royalty could be based on the actual or potential harm to the
database proprietor's market. This seems like the best indication of the
real price of data in a database. However, proving harm in a dollar amount
would probably prove too difficult for a database proprietor. Third, the
royalty amount could be fixed by something like the copyright royalty arbitration panel, a third party through which the licensee and licensor may
fairly negotiate a royalty amount. Fourth, the royalty could be fixed as a
proportion of the cost to the database compiler in gathering, organizing, or
maintaining the database. Because the database proprietor must maintain
records of such costs to show that such expenses were substantial, as an
element of a prima facie case of violation of the statute, the information
required to set royalties is available and also personalized to each database
271. For every phonorecord made and distributed on or after January 1, 1998 and
before January 1, 2000, the rate is either 7.1¢ per record made based on a copyrighted
recording or 1.35€ per minute of playing time of a record based on a copyrighted recording, whichever is greater. 37 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1999). In a slightly different context, the
royalty rate is fixed through voluntary negotiations or through the assessment of a copyright royalty arbitration panel.
272. One compulsory license under the Copyright Act requires the prospective commercial user who provides customers with a protected work to file specific information
in the Copyright Office. This information includes its subscribers and accounts, the list
of copyrighted works regularly taken, and a payment of statutorily calculated royalties to
the Register of Copyright. 'This is the mechanism for the Cable License, which establishes a compulsory license for secondary transmissions by cable television system. 17

U.S.C. § 111 (1999).
Failure to follow the statutory procedures results in infringement. The Librarian of
Congress, under the recommendation of the Register, distributes the collective royalties
to parties who file claims of entitlement with the Register. This system is effective where
the commercial use of the licensee may be quantified in terms of accounts with buyers of
the licensee's services. A related compulsory license fixes the royalty amount for a subscriber of satellite carrier television transmissions to the public for private use. See 17

U.S.C. § 119 (1999).
Moreover, compulsory license is amenable to situations where the licensee is taking
work from multiple rightsholders, which is dealt with by pooling the royalties from various licensees and distributing them proportionally to rightsholders. However, in the
context of database protection, such a system is not necessary because the identity of the
rightsholder is known.
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and database proprietor. Fifth, the statute could leave several options for
determining the royalty amount for the plaintiff to choose, thereby allowing
the party with the greatest interest in the amount, the
database owner, to
27 3
select the optimal approach on a case-by-case basis.
Although the details remain to be worked out, a compulsory license
would significantly abate the recompilation problem. Thus, a new
database maker who wished to borrow from Poisindex could legally force
Micromedex to license its data. This would create new opportunities for
competition and effectively set a ceiling on the price that a database proprietor could demand for the use and extraction of its database contents.
c. Eliminating Freedom of Contract Issues
Another problem is that users may be forced to contract away their rights
under the statutory exceptions to House Bill 354. The EU Database Directive attempts to deal with an analogous problem. It provides that "[a]ny
contractual provision contrary to Articles 6(1) and 8 shall be null and
void." 27 4 Article 6(1) deals with copyright protection for creative
databases and Article 8 states that "itihe maker of a database which is
made available to the public in whatever manner may not prevent a lawful
user of the database from extracting and/or re-utilising insubstantial parts
of its contents, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, for any purposes whatsoever."27 5 The Directive keeps parties from contracting
around this express exclusion from database protection.
A similar provision should be added to House Bill 354 stating that any
contractual provision contrary to Sections 1403, the "permitted acts" section, or 1404, the exclusions section, is unenforceable in an action under
the statute.2 76 Without such a provision limiting contract law, the exceptions and exclusions could effectively dissolve under shrink-wrap 27 7 and
click-wrap 278 licenses.
The proposed provision would ensure that a database provider could
not force users to sign a contract surrendering their rights under the "permitted acts" and "exclusions" sections in House Bill 354. For example,
273. Another approach is to allow the court to determine a "reasonable royalty." See
35 U.S.C. § 284. The amount would reflect the licensing fee the user would pay in a
hypothetical negotiation with the database owner.
274. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 15; see RrEs & CHmALTON, supra note 82,
at 172.
275. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 8; see REEs & CHARLTON, supra note 82,
at 170.
276. It is questionable whether each of the permitted acts or exclusions should be
protected under a contract-preemption provision. For example, users arguably should
be able to surrender by contract those rights under § 1403(f), which provides something
like a first-sale doctrine. Otherise, a consumer, such as a library, could purchase a
database and provide rental access to the database, directly harming the market for the
database.
277. A shrink-wrap license is a license contract contained on the packaging of
software. Use of the software is an acceptance of the agreement.
278. A click-wrap license is a license contract contained on the entrance page of an
Internet site. Clicking on the "acceptance" button of the page is an acceptance of the
agreement.
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even if Micromedex provided access to Poisindex through an Internet site
that required the acceptance of a click-wrap contract eliminating the user's
rights under Sections 1403 and 1404, the addition of this contract-preemption provision would give Micromedex no cause of action under the statute
against a user falling within the exceptions or exclusions. At the same
time, Micromedex should be able to bring an action in state court for
breach of contract if a user violates the terms of the agreement. A database
proprietor should still be able to restrict the access and use of the contents
of its database through a contract; however, she should not be able to override statutory exceptions through forced contracts. Such a provision
would prevent savvy database providers from benefiting from statutory sui
generis rights while circumventing the statutory restrictions on the sui
generis right by forcing users to contract out of the statutory exceptions
and exclusions.
d. Mitigating the Perpetual Duration Problem
The term of protection for databases under House Bill 354 is potentially
perpetual because a database proprietor may mix protected and unprotected data. This problem is particularly difficult because most useful
databases are dynamic, and in many instances, new data will be added to a
preexisting database. There are basically three ways to deal with this
dilemma.
First, the statute could state that the entire collection of data in a protected database enters the public domain after any portion of the database
expires under the fifteen-year term. Thus, if Micromedex first compiled
Poisindex in 2000, then even though Micromedex subsequently added a
separate set of data in 2005, the entire database, including the addition,
would enter the public domain in 2015. The problem with this approach is
that Micromedex may be encouraged to create separate databases to ensure
the new database obtains protection, even if the combination of information is not the most efficient form for the database. In other words, if old
data corrupts the protection of new additions, database proprietors may be
reluctant to make additions in the most efficient way.
Second, the statute could state that although an addition to or alteration of the data in a protected database can engender a new term of protection for the added portion, the database must clearly indicate which items
of data are protected and which items are in the public domain. In other
words, where some portions of a database may be protected while others
are not, as under the current version of House Bill 354, the database proprietor must keep those portions dearly separate.
There are several problems with this approach. First, it would be
costly for a database proprietor to label every item of data as either protected or unprotected. Those costs would no doubt be transferred to consumers. Second, this approach could create a thorny factual issue in
litigation. Even if the database-proprietor plaintiff must show that the
extracted data was protected at the time of extraction, the database proprietor could easily manufacture the required evidence since all the evidence
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required to prove this element would belong to the plaintiff. It is unlikely
that a user would know when the proprietor first placed the extracted information into the database.
Third, the statute could state that an addition to or alteration of the
data in a protected database can extend the protection to a new term of
fifteen years, but only if the addition or alteration fundamentally changes
the character of the original database. This is similar, but not identical, to
the predecessor of House Bill 354 and the EU Database Directive. The
Directive states:
Any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the contents of a database, including any substantial change resulting from the
accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, which would
result in the database being considered to be a substantial new investment,
evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, shall qualify27the
database resulting
9
from that investment for its own term of protection.
The standard for determining whether a database qualifies for a new
term of protection under the Directive is whether the alteration constitutes
"a substantial new investment." However, by raising the standard to
whether an alteration constitutes a fundamental change in the character of
the original database, a database proprietor would have a higher hurdle for
obtaining new protection. Therefore, she would have to alter the fundamental character of the database every fifteen years to obtain protection.
The fundamental character of the database could be cashed out in
quantitative terms where it is fundamentally changed and thereby consists
of less than half of the original items of data. Thus, doubling the size of the
database while keeping all of the original data would constitute a fundamental change. Deleting half of the original data would by itself constitute
a fundamental change. Also, deleting twenty-five percent of the original
items of data and adding a number of items equal to twenty-five percent of
the original database would also constitute a fundamental change.
Although qualitative factors-substantial changes in the organization of the
data, substantial investments in verifying and gathering new data-could
also play a role in characterizing the fundamental character of a database,
quantitative factors have the virtue of definiteness.
This option is problematic because it creates the possibility of
obtaining perpetual protection. However, if there is no feasible alternative,
raising the standard for obtaining extended protection is the best option
because it may limit the instances where a proprietor may obtain extended
protection. Moreover, the potential for perpetual protection becomes less
worrisome where the protection afforded to databases is weakened under
new mitigating provisions for the proposed legislation, such as those suggested. All things considered, the current term provision in House Bill 354
should be replaced by a provision stating, in effect, that an addition to or
alteration of a collection of information that fundamentally changes the
279. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 10(3).
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character of the original database begins a new fifteen-year term of protection for the entire database.
e.

Switching the Burden of Proof

House Bill 354 places the burden of proof on the alleged infringer to prove
28 0
that one of the enumerated exceptions applies and she is not liable.
This may cause users to be overly cautious with otherwise legal uses and
extractions of data. A solution to this problem is to include a provision
placing the burden of proof on the database-proprietor plaintiff to prove
that the alleged pirate did not fall within an exemption under the "permitted acts" section of House Bill 354.281 For example, in addition to the
other elemehts for a prima facie case, the plaintiff would have to prove that
(i) the defendant did not extract or use the information for nonprofit educational, scientific, or research purposes, or (ii) if the defendant did extract
or use the information for nonprofit educational, scientific, or research
purposes, the extraction or use directly harmed the actual market for the
product or service. 28 2 Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff will
make an action under the statute significantly more difficult and costly for
the plaintiff and curb the plaintiffs ever-present threat of litigation, which
could otherwise stifle legal uses of protected databases.
f. Ending the Indefiniteness
The vagueness and imprecision of the terms and exceptions of House Bill
354 may cause a chilling effect in the scientific and academic communities.
The problematic expressions include "substantial part," "harm to the
actual or potential market," and "through the investment of substantial
monetary or other resources," each of which occur in proposed Section
1402.283 Moreover, the blanket exception for the use or extraction for

"educational, scientific, research, and additional reasonable uses" is too
indefinite. The following considers possible provisional cures for each
problem.

1) Defining Substantial Part
Two provisions should be added to House Bill 354 to deal with the vagueness of "a substantial part, measured either quantitatively or qualitatively,"
which is the standard used to determine whether the defendant misappropriated a sufficient amount of the database to incur liability. 28 4 The
notion of a "substantial part" only makes sense relative to a particular
280. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(a)); see
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 163, at 809-10.
281. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403). Note that instead of requiring the plaintiff to
meet a burden of proof, one could require that the plaintiff have the burden of production-a burden to produce some evidence on that issue to avoid an adverse decision.
Once some evidence is brought forth, the burden could switch back to the defendant to
prove its truth or falsity.
282. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(1)).
283. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402).
284. Id.
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database; a substantial part of a small database may consist of a few items
of data whereas a substantial part of a large database may consist of many
items of data. Therefore, both "substantial part" and "collection of information" need to be made more precise.
First, the collection of information should be fixed to some extent by
the constitution of the database at the time of the alleged misappropriation. Thus, if Micromedex has 10,000 poison antidotes at the time a pet
store extracts 2000 and Micromedex subsequently eliminates 5000 items
from its database, the working collection of information for the purpose of
this issue is the original 10,000 poison antidotes. Second, the definition of
"collection of information" should concede the possibility of there being a
database within a database. 28 5 For example, a database of real estate listings throughout the United States may consist of fifty independent
databases, one for each state. Thus, where an alleged pirate extracts all the
listings for Nebraska, this amount should, at least conceivably, be measured against the database for that state rather than the database containing each state combined. The difference is one of extracting the whole
database or a very small portion-perhaps less than one-fiftieth-of the
overall database. Otherwise, large databases would be inherently disadvantaged under the statute. Third, restrictions should be placed on the
database proprietor's ability to define her database on an ad hoc basis. If
the database proprietor is able to define her database any way she pleases,
she can always prove that an alleged pirate extracted or used the whole of
that arbitrarily defined database.
Delineating useful restrictions is no easy task. One consideration in
restricting the definition of a database is whether that collection of information would have an independently sustainable market. 28 6 For example,
if there is an independent market for a collection of Nebraska real estate
listings, then the proprietor could conceivably define her database as a
compilation of Nebraska listings. This may also allow databases for large
cities such as Chicago and New York, while disallowing a proposed
database for Ithaca, New York listings, depending on the market demand
for such information. Another factor that could restrict the definition of a
database is the separability of the information. Some types of data are
only valuable as a collection. 28 7 As such, these databases should be
defined as the larger set of items. A third factor is the searchability or categorization of the information. For example, if Poisindex is not categorized
according to animal-poison antidotes and the database cannot be searched
to produce a listing of animal-poison antidotes, then Micromedex should
be precluded from claiming that the collection of animal-poison antidotes
285. House Bill 1258 makes this concession. See supra Part III.B.l.a.
286. Credit for this idea should be given to Peter Martin, Professor of Law at Cornell
Law School.
287. Credit for this idea should be given to Jeffrey Sickel, a computer programmer in
Chicago, Illinois. He noted that some market research databases are only valuable as a
whole. Individual items have no value because only the collection of data as a whole
provides the required analysis for market research.
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is an independent database. 28 8
The notion of a "substantial part, measured either quantitatively or
qualitatively" should also be defined to give users a better idea of how
much data they can take from a protected database without incurring liability. Although House Bill 354 explicitly permits the extraction of individual items of data, the statute, or additional regulations, should set out
quantitative guidelines. For example, a guideline could state that any individual may extract or use up to five percent of an overall collection of information, measured against the database existing at the time of
extraction, 28 9 over a period of five years. Thus, if Poisindex contained
10,000 poison antidotes as a whole, a person could extract up to 500 of the
2 90
items over a period of five years without the risk of incurring liability.
Fixing the actual percentage amount, whether at five percent or some
other level, should provide a compromise. The fact that most databases are
valuable because they are comprehensive suggests that taking only five percent of the items from a protected database will not significantly hurt the
original database in any significant way. However, if the items in a
database are independently valuable and a pirate is capable of selectively
taking only the most valuable items in the database, she could undermine
the database proprietor's investment by selecting and extracting the most
valuable five percent. Thus, a specific percentage should be chosen that
balances these and other considerations.
Under this construction of "substantial part," a user may extract or
use fixed portions of databases without the chance of infringing the
database owner's statutory rights. However, it should not be presumed
under the statute that extracting more than a specific percentage constitutes infringement. Rather, the amount simply more specifically defines
288. Although this factor will be dependent on somewhat arbitrary categorizations of
data and electronic databases with powerful engine software would be advantaged, it
could preclude database makers from completely arbitrary definitions of their database.
289. The clear exception for a certain quantitative amount probably should be measured against the overall database, as opposed to a database within a database, since the
user will probably not be able to estimate how the proprietor will try to define her working database at the time of litigation. A database within a database is not clearly defined
and would not provide sufficient definiteness.
This does however allow a problem where a user extracts a few items of data in 1999,
when the database contained, one hundred items, but then in 2000, several thousand
items are added to the database. Even though in 2000, five percent of the current
database may consist of over one hundred items, the user would be restricted to
extracting only five items. In other words, the first extraction fixes the total number of
allowable extractions. This problem is slightly tempered by the fact that a database proprietor could conceivable eliminate items of data and create a situation where the user
could legally extract the whole database under the five-percent formula.
290. If such a provision is added to database legislation, the statute may also have to
impose certain formalities upon database proprietors. For example, the statute probably should require that a database owner publish the total number of items of data in
the database at any particular time. Thus, Micromedex would always provide users with
the total number of poison antidotes in their Poisindex, allowing the user to decide how
many items he can legally extract.
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exempt amounts for the user.2 9 1
In summary, provisions should be added to House Bill 354. One provision should state that "collection of information" in the context of a use
or extraction of a substantial part means a collection of items defined in
terms of the ability for the collection to sustain an independent market, the
separability of the information, the categorization or searchability of the
overall collection, and other relevant factors at the time of the alleged misappropriation. Another provision should define "substantial part" as more
than, say, five percent over a five year period of the overall collection of
information at the time of the first extraction or use. Beyond that amount,
a substantial part is measured relative to a particular "collection of information" and measured quantitatively and qualitatively.
2) Defining Harm to the Market
A provision should be added to House Bill 354 to sharpen and explicate the
expression "harm to the actual or potential market."2 92 Although the statute needs further clarification, it contained some additional language
describing the type of harm contemplated. First, the statute speaks to
"[a]ny person who extracts, or uses in commerce" a proscribed amount of
the database and further states that the database proprietor only obtains
protection for her database if it "is offered or intended to be offered for sale
or otherwise in commerce." 293 These restrictions are required for constitutional reasons, since the source of the statute would be the Commerce
Clause, not the Intellectual Property Clause.2 94 The first restriction
implies that a noncommercial use, although not an extraction, 2 95 for private purposes may not constitute an infringement. Thus, the bill explicitly
allowed any personal use of a protected database. The second restriction
implies that a database proprietor cannot protect her database unless she
sells or intends to sell her database. 2 96 Thus, a database owner cannot sit
291. In addition, some qualitative elements of a "substantial part" may add specificity, although such additions are by their nature less definite than a quantitative
measurement.
292. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402).
293. Id.
294. Section 1401(4) defines "commerce" as "all commerce which may be lawfully
regulated by the Congress." Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1401(4)).
295. House Bill 354 states that "[a]ny person who extracts, or uses in commerce, all
or a substantial part ....
" of an otherwise protected database is potentially liable. As
written, it does not limit extractions to commercial extractions. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C.
§ 1402). However, it is not clear whether the bill should include all extractions. For
example, suppose a person extracts the entirety of a protected paper version of a directory to his computer for his own personal convenience .and never provided others with
access to his electronic copy. Presumably, he would not be violating the statute even
though he harms the owner's actual or potential market in the strictest sense. However,
because the language proscribes any extractions, not just commercial extractions, such a
person could be held liable. Arguably, such a person should be prevented from personal
extractions.
296. This is significantly different from copyright law. Under copyright law, a work
can still be infringed upon even where the author or owner of the right does not sell or
intend to sell the work. Moreover, because of this divergence from copyright law, showing harm to the market is more difficult in the case of databases. Under the fair use
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on her data and obtain protection for her database. 2 97 This language significantly confined the analysis of a possible violation to commercial uses
of a commercial database.
Second, "potential market" is defined under House Bill 354 as "any
market that a person claiming protection under Section 1402 has current
and demonstratable plans to exploit or that is commonly exploited by persons offering similar products or services incorporating collections of
information." 298 This limits the scope of potential markets. However, both
this language and the language discussed above fail to provide any guidance as to the amount or type of harm needed to trigger a violation of
House Bill 354.
Obviously, actual harm to the database proprietor is strong evidence
against an alleged pirate. For example, if Micromedex could show that it
lost a contract because a potential customer obtained the information she
sought from a pirate, then harm is shown dispositively. Since this type of
evidence would probably be rare, a provision should be added defining
"harm" as demonstrable harm, probable harm, or the meaningful likelihood of future harm.
Borrowing from copyright law, "probable" and "meaningful likelihood" of harm could be cashed out in terms of factors such as whether the
use diminishes the potential sale or license of an otherwise protected
database, whether the use tends to interfere with the database's marketabil29 9
ity, or whether the use fulfills the demand for the original database.
Common to each of these factors are several additional factors. First, where
a use or extraction is made accessible to the public, or at least potential
customers of the protected database, the use or extraction is more likely to
harm the actual or potential market of the database owner. Second, where
a use or extraction is made from a database for which there is a demonstrably high demand, the use or extraction is more likely to harm the actual or
potential market. Third, if the original database is marketed to a limited
geographical area, either intrinsically or by choice, 30 0 use or extraction
outside that area is less likely to harm the actual or potential market.
exception, an otherwise infringing use of a copyrighted work is exempt from liability
under a rough four-factor balancing test. The last factor for determining fair use is the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. For this
determination, the court looks at whether a particular use is commercial or noncommercial-educational, nonprofit-where a commercial use is a strong indication that the
use hurts the potential market for the copyrighted work. LEAFER, supra note 10, at 43839. However, in the case of databases, since only commercial uses are violative, the
commercial aspect of a use cannot inform the court as to whether the use harmed the
database owner's market.
297. This precludes people from accumulating data, protecting the data, and then
preventing others from doing the same through their protection. This phenomenon is
more common in patent law where public interest groups patent a new invention without the intention to market it or sell it to prevent a company from obtaining a monopoly
over the invention.
298. H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1401(3)).
299. LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 440.
300. For example, a phone or business directory for people and businesses in Ithaca,
New York is intrinsically more valuable to people in Ithaca.
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Fourth, evidence that the alleged pirate made money from the use or
extraction should be strong evidence that the pirate harmed the database
owner's actual or potential market.
For example, if an alleged pirate simply extracts Poisindex onto her
computer's hard drive at no expense to Micromedex, Micromedex would
have a difficult time showing that the use harmed its market where the use
is private. However, if the alleged pirate's use allows her to avoid paying a
license fee to Micromedex, Micromedex would have a stronger case,
although still weak because the use is not commercial. However, if the
alleged pirate publishes an extracted portion on her private web site, again,
Micromedex would have a stronger case, although still weak because the
extraction is not made widely and publicly accessible. But if the alleged
pirate advertised the site and linked her site to commercial sites,
Micromedex would have a strong case that her use is harming their actual
and potential market. Furthermore, if the original, protected database is a
successful service for which there is a high demand, the case is even
stronger. The result is a continuum of actual or possible harm to actual or
potential markets.
In summary, the expression "harm to the actual or potential market"
can be sharpened to encompass demonstratable harm, probable harm, or
the meaningful likelihood of future harm, measured against such factors as
the accessibility of the pirated data, the demand for the data, whether there
are geographical restraints of the marketability of the data, and whether
the pirate actually made money from the use or extraction.
3)

Defining a Substantial Investment to Trigger Protection

Provisions should be added to House Bill 354 to explain the expression
"gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources."'3 01 It is clear from the
language of House Bill 354 that wholesale copying of data from another
source, such as downloading data from an Internet-accessible database,
would not constitute a sufficiently substantial investment to warrant protection. Depending on how the expression is interpreted, this could be a
substantial bar to protection for database makers. However, unless the
notions in this expression are made more definite, no user of a database
dare rely on it to use or extract data from an otherwise protected database.
The notions that need to be made more precise are of two types. The
expressions "gathered," "organized," and "maintained" involve the behavior
for which a substantial investment can produce protection. The expression
"investment of substantial monetary or other sources" involves the amount
of investment and its measurement.
First, "gathered" should be defined to include collecting data from
original sources and independent research. It also should include collecting data from otherwise protected sources, either legally under an exception or through licensing. Clearly, the final statute should reward the
301. H.R. 354 § 2 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1402).
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"sweat of brow" associated with producing an original source of the datafor example, collecting addresses and telephone numbers for a new directory. Moreover, the statute should protect the costs of performing costly
research that produces data. The statute, however, should also create protection if the database maker incurs sufficient costs from bringing together
data from multiple sources, recompilation,30 regardless
of whether the
2
sources are already accessible and protected.
Second, "organized" should be defined to include sufficiently substantial investments for categorizing data, obtaining and implementing search
engines for electronic data, and presenting data. The EU Database Directive explicitly mentions that a database maker may3obtain protection for
30
costs incurred in "presenting" data in a database.
Third, while "maintaining" should be defined to include verifying the
accuracy of the data, it should exclude substantial investment incurred in
providing legal protection for the database. Thus, if Micromedex copied its
original version of Poisindex from an unprotected source that did not validate the accuracy of the data, Micromedex should be able to obtain protection if they confirm and verify its accuracy. Not only does the EU
Database Directive specifically mention that "verification" may engender
protection 30 4 but also this protection is justified. Since Micromedex could
potentially be held liable for the inaccuracy of the data,305 it should be
remunerated for verifying its accuracy. At the same time, if the accuracy of
the original source was already significantly validated, then independent
verification by Micromedex should not engender new protection. Moreover, the costs incurred by a database proprietor in protecting her investment through legal (contractual), technological (encryption technology), or
other means (general legal fees) should not count toward the maintenance
of the database.
Fourth, "investment of substantial monetary or other sources" should
be defined to allow for cumulative investments over a period of years, and it
should specify a lower limit required to obtain any protection. The investment requirement should not discriminate between investments made
completely at inception and investments made over the entire period until
an alleged misappropriation. The relevant investment includes all the
expenses incurred up to the point when the alleged pirate committed the
questionable use or extraction. Additionally, a provision should set a minimum monetary investment requirement for obtaining protection. Since
only commercial databases are protected under House Bill 354, it is reasonable to expect the database proprietor to have expenditures associated
302. Many current Internet search engines are databases where the data are collected
by "robots" that index sites and then tabulate the results into a database that may be
searched by a browser. It is not clear whether this type of "gathering" is contemplated
under House Bill 354. The exclusion for "digital on-line communications" suggests, at
first blush, that these databases are not protected. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1404(c)).
303. The Directive protects any investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting data.
Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 8, § 1 recital 40.

304. Id.
305. See supra Part III.A.1.b.
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with the database. Moreover, all the types of expenses associated with producing a commercial database have monetary equivalents; whether the
resource utilized to make the database is capital, labor, or technology, the
expense can be measured in dollars. 30 6 Although the minimum investment amount should be relatively low, and perhaps increased annually
based on an inflationary scale, meeting the requirement should not constitute prima facie protection. In other words, while the database maker must
meet the amount for obtaining the possibility of protection, meeting the
30 7
amount would not ensure protection.
In sum, the expression "gathered, organized, or maintained by another
person through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources"
can be made more definite by defining of each of the substantive terms:
"gathered," "organized," "maintained," and "investment of substantial monetary or other resources." Of particular importance, "maintained" should
be defined to encompass verification of data, and "investment of substantial monetary or other resources" should be defined to set a minimum dollar amount of investment required for any protection.
4) Sharpening the Reasonable Use Exceptions
Regulations or guidelines should accompany House Bill 354 to explicate
the blanket exception for individual acts of use or extraction for "educational, scientific, research, and additional reasonable uses." As written, the
exception contemplates a balancing test consisting of factors such as
whether the use or extraction is commercial, whether the alleged pirate
used or extracted the data in good faith, whether the extracted data is
incorporated into a database that is similar to the original, and whether the
alleged pirate is in the same, or similar, business as the original database
maker.30 8 A bad-faith, commercial extraction by a person in the database
industry who incorporates the data into a similar database as the original
would not benefit from the exception. However, a good-faith, nonprofit
extraction by a scientist who uses the data in a completely different context
would presumably be shielded from liability. The test provides some indication of proscribed and allowable uses and extractions; however, without
306. According to one commentator, an investment, measured qualitatively or quantitatively, as used in an analogous context by the EU Database Directive includes investments through financial, human or technical resources. REEs & CHARLTON, supra note
82, at 59-60; see also Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations, SI (1997) 1997/
3032 § 13(1) (Eng.). Under Regulation 12(1), "substantial" as measured in relation to
any investment, extraction, or re-utilization means substantial in terms of quantity or
quality, or a combination of both. This would include advancing capital to fund the
making or renewal of a database (financial resources), hiring staff or contractors or making them available for the work on the database (human resources), and the provision of
computing capacity or know-how (technical resources).
307. Conceivably, the dollar amount could be relativized to the type of behavior
under which the proprietor claims protection: gathering, organizing, or maintaining.
However, the database maker is being remunerated for her investment in producing a
useful database, regardless of how she goes about making the improvement or creation.
308. See supra Part III.B.2.f.
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more definiteness, potentially useful and legal database uses may be
avoided.
In the legislative history of the Copyright Act's "fair use" provision, a
set of guidelines are laid out for classroom uses of copyrighted works. The
guidelines contain a provision for single copying by teachers,30 9 but more
appropriate to database legislation, the guidelines contain a provision dealing with multiple copies for classroom use. The gist of the latter provision
is that copying is legal provided it meets (i) a brevity requirement that is
defined for four kinds of works-poetry, prose, illustrations, and special
works; (ii) a spontaneity requirement which is defined in terms of the possibility that the user had time to obtain permission from the copyright
holder; (iii) a cumulative effect test, which specifically precludes more than
"nine instances of such multiple copying for one course during one class
term"; (iv) a requirement that each copy contains notice of copyright; and
(v) a requirement that the use does not replace the market for the original
3 10
work and the teacher does not charge her students for the copies.
Although failure to meet these requirements does not constitute copyright
infringement, if a person meets the requirements, he is almost certain to
obtain an exemption from liability. These guidelines provide a useful
model for research and educational uses and extractions for databases.
A similar guideline should be added to House Bill 354 to expressly
exempt certain educational, scientific, and research uses or extractions of
data. In particular, the guidelines should specify that a use or extraction is
exempt provided it meets (i) a brevity requirement, 3 1 1 (ii) a spontaneity
requirement, (iii) a cumulative effect test, (iv) a requirement that the use or
extraction mentions the original protected database, and (v) a requirement
that the use or extraction is not-for-profit and does not replace the market
for the original database. The details of the guidelines are left to be worked
out; however, a guideline of this form could significantly reduce any "chilling effect" caused by the indefinite balancing test under the House Bill 354
proposal.
In sum, numerous terms in House Bill 354 should be made more precise. Although the language of House Bill 354 would no doubt become
more definite as the courts develop case law interpreting the statute, the
potential danger for overprotection of data requires definiteness now.
In general, a number of additional provisions and guidelines should
be added to House Bill 354 to eliminate or mitigate the problems associated with the bill. In particular, provisions should be added (i) creating an
element for infringement that targets proprietors attempting to monopolize
the sole source of data; (ii) creating a compulsory license in certain cir309. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976).

310. Id.
311. This requirement would be similar to the limitation suggested for measuring a
"substantial part"; however, in this case, the amount would be significantly more generous. For example, if a pirate must use or extract more than five percent to be liable, then
a research user under the exception would specify that the person must use or extract
more than fifteen percent to be liable.
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cumstances; (iii) creating a limited preemption of contracts; (iv) raising the
standard for obtaining a new term of protection; (v) switching the burden
of proof to the plaintiff to show that the defendant does not have an exempt
status; and (vi) creating more definite rules by sharpening terms in the
proposed statute and specifying guidelines exempting certain educational,
scientific, and research uses or extractions. By incorporating these suggestions into a successor to House Bill 354, database legislation would bear
the following characteristics, where the italicized parts denote suggested
changes.
Compromise Proposal for U.S. Database Protection
Source

The proposal would expand the Copyright Act with a Chapter called
"Misappropriation of Collections of Information" and protect non-creative

databases. However, the source of protection would stem from the Commerce
Clause, not the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Scope

Rights

Exceptions

Duration

Remedies

Protection would apply to (1) factual databases, as defined by the statute; (2) for
which the data is publicly accessible through alternative means, (3) gathered,
organized, or maintained through an investment of substantial monetary or
other resources, as defined by the statute; and (4) used in commerce.
The statute would prohibit (1) the extraction of all or a substantial part, as
defined by the statute,of the contents of the database that (2) caused harm to the
actual or potential market of the owner, as defined by the statute (3) where the
alleged infringer does not have an exemption under certain specified exceptions.
The statute would offer at least the following exceptions: (1) fair use measures
for scientific, education and research purposes; and (2) individuals acts of use
or extraction of data for the purpose of illustration, explanation, example,
comment, criticism, teaching, research, or analysis-as explicated by guidelines.
The statute would also offer exclusions for government collections and news
reporting. The statute would provide for a procedure through which a user
could obtain a compulsory license to use or extract data from an otherwise
protected database. In addition, the statute would void any contractualprovision
contrary to certain specified exceptions.
The property right in the database would continue for a fifteen-year period
beginning when the database was injected into commerce, but this period could
restart upon a change in the fundamental character of the original collection of
information.
The bill prescribed civil remedies-injunctive relief; impoundment; and
monetary relief, including damages and attorney's fees-and criminal penalties
including fines ranging from $250,000 to $500,000 and imprisonment for five
to ten years.

The added provisions, definitions, and guidelines are needed to provide the balance between promoting investment in databases and protecting the public domain. Moreover, the compromise proposal moves toward
securing international protection for U.S. databases.
2.

InternationalDatabaseProtection

The compromise proposal would offer opportunities to secure international protection for U.S. databases. Not only would the compromise
engender a fair chance to obtain reciprocal protection in the European
Union but also it could be used as a platform for negotiating further international protection through amendments to the Berne Convention, the
WIPO Treaty, TRIPS, or an entirely new international instrument.
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First, although the compromise proposal contains surface differences
from the requirements set forth in the EU Database Directive, the compromise has a decent chance for obtaining reciprocal protection in the European Union. To obtain reciprocal protection from EU member countries,
the United States must provide "comparable protection" to the EU sui
generis right as determined by the EU Council. 3 12 On each of the substantive provisions in the Directive, the compromise proposal contains analogous provisions. Indeed, the EU Database Directive elaborated many of the
solutions in the compromise proposal. Furthermore, even the more significant disparities between the compromise proposal and the Directive may
be overlooked. Although the European Union currently benefits from the
lack of protection of U.S. databases in the European Union, the United
States still possesses significant bargaining power because it is the single
largest market for databases and database services. Just as U.S. database
makers cannot protect their databases in the European Union, under current U.S. law, EU database makers cannot protect their databases in the
United States. Finally, in considering the options available for U.S.
database legislation, the compromise, or some refined version of it, is no
doubt the most agreeable. House Bill 1858 would not provide any opportunity for international protection whereas House Bill 354 would provide too
much protection for databases in the United States. The United States has
an interest in providing no more protection to foreign databases than can
be achieved in the foreign jurisdictions.
Second, the compromise proposal could provide a standard for
increasing international protection of databases under multilateral treaties-the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty-and trade agreements
(TRIPS). Once the United States adopts domestic database legislation, they
can negotiate added international protection for U.S. databases through an
amendment to one of the existing instruments or through the creation of
an entirely new instrument. Instead of resisting any international database
protection, the United States could then play an active role designing protection that will favor its interests. Until the United States commits to some
form of domestic database protection, they cannot play a positive role in
negotiating international protection.
In sum, the compromise proposal could have the immediate benefit of
obtaining reciprocal database protection in EU member countries, and it
could also give the United States an edge in negotiating broader international protection through treaties and trade agreements.
Conclusion
Database legislation should accomplish three goals. It should create an
incentive for U.S. businesses to invest in databases, ensure that scientists
and the public continue to profit from easy access to information, and
secure international protection. Although none of the contemplated legislative proposals satisfy these three goals, the compromise proposal might.
312. Database Directive, supra note 120, art. 11 recital 56.
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House Bill 1258 fails to fulfill two of the goals. As written, the bill
simply provides too little protection to create a sufficient incentive for U.S.
businesses to invest in databases. Moreover, the bill fails to secure needed
international protection. Under the current international framework, U.S.
database makers cannot achieve any protection for non-creative databases
unless Congress enacts legislation comparable to the EU Database Directive. House Bill 1258 does not provide comparable protection. For both of
these reasons, it cannot resolve the database dilemma.
House Bill 354 fails to fulfill the other remaining goal; it does not
ensure that scientists and the public continue to profit from access to information. Although the sui generis right under House Bill 354 would likely
secure reciprocal international protection under the EU Database Directive,
it unnecessarily provides too much protection for database makers in the
United States. For this reason, it cannot resolve the database dilemma.
Compared to House Bill 1858 and House Bill 354, the compromise
proposal comes closest to meeting each challenge. While going far beyond
House Bill 1858 in creating an incentive for U.S. database makers, it avoids
the overly protective regime of House Bill 354. Moreover, the compromise
proposal is designed with an eye toward international protection and thus
offers a fair chance for gaining some international protection under the EU
Database Directive. All things considered, the compromise proposal comes
closest to resolving the database dilemma in the United States.

